


**United States Army in World War II
Mediterranean Theater of Operations**

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

by
Albert N. Garland
and
Howard McGaw Smyth
Assisted by
Martin Blumenson



CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993

Chapter XIV The Climax

Sardinia Versus the Mainland

The successful invasion of Sicily clarified strategic problems and enabled the Allies to turn from debate to decision. The Combined Chiefs of Staff at the TRIDENT Conference in May had directed General Eisenhower to knock Italy out of the war and contain the maximum number of German forces, but they had not told him how. Preparing to launch operations beyond the Sicilian Campaign, AFHQ had developed several outline plans: BUTTRESS, invasion of the Italian toe by the British 10 Corps; GOBLET, a thrust at the ball of the Italian foot by the British 5 Corps; BRIMSTONE, invasion of Sardinia; and FIREBRAND, invasion of Corsica. But a firm decision on the specific course of action to be taken was still lacking.¹

The four plans, Eisenhower had explained to Churchill during the Algiers meetings in June, pointed to two broad alternative courses. If the Axis resisted vigorously in Sicily, thereby forecasting high Italian morale and a bitter and protracted struggle for the Allies, then BRIMSTONE and FIREBRAND, insular operations, were preferable. Otherwise, operations on the Italian mainland were more promising. Despite Churchill's articulate enthusiasm for the latter course, Eisenhower had made no commitment. He awaited the factual evidence to be furnished in Sicily.

Meanwhile, the Americans and British continued to argue over strategy. The Americans remained intent on guaranteeing a cross-Channel attack in 1944 and also advocated operations in Burma. The British were still intrigued by Mediterranean opportunities. The crux of the argument hinged on resources.

Conscious of theater requirements after Sicily, no matter what operations were launched, General Eisenhower on 29 June asked the Combined Chiefs whether two American convoys could be diverted to his command. He requested a total of 13 combat loaders (9 for personnel, 4 for cargo) for retention in the theater. He recommended retaining 15 American destroyers in the area. He forecast his need for 930 military government officers in case of rapid Italian collapse. He again sought assurance that 40 ships per month were to be allocated to meet civilian supply requirements in Italy.²

The Combined Chiefs made no immediate commitment, for they too were awaiting the initial results of the Sicily invasion. Not until 15 July--five days after the invasion--did the Combined Staff Planners draft a proposed reply to Eisenhower's requests, and they favored granting Eisenhower's wishes. Still, the divergence of American and British views prevented acceptance. The U.S. planners called attention to requirements elsewhere in the world. The British planners saw "the potential results" in the Mediterranean "so great" as to make unthinkable denying Eisenhower the resources he wished.³

Discussing their planners' recommendations on 16 July, the CCS decided to defer action on Eisenhower's requests for resources, even though the news from Sicily was good. At Admiral Leahy's suggestion, the Combined Chiefs agreed to accept Eisenhower's strategic concept (as embodied in AFHQ's four outline plans,) but only "for planning purposes," and at General Marshall's suggestion, they informed Eisenhower of their interest in a direct

landing at Naples in place of an invasion of Sardinia, "if the indications regarding Italian resistance should make the risks involved worthwhile."⁴

Indications of crumbling Italian resistance continued to encourage the Allies. With increasing frequency, reports from Sicily made clear the advanced state of disintegration in the Italian Army. In contrast, German units were displaying "their traditional determination and skill," probably stimulated, AFHQ guessed, by the "poor performance of their Allies."⁵

Looking to the Italian mainland, AFHQ believed that the Germans would reinforce the Italians and prepare for a strong defense of the Italian heel because of its proximity to the Balkans. In contrast, AFHQ planners underestimated the importance of the toe, Calabria, to the Axis. The planners felt that the terrain was not suitable for employing large forces; supply routes were vulnerable to Allied air attack, the Germans would find air support of their ground troops almost impossible, and their forces in that area would be continually threatened by the possibility of successive Allied seaborne outflanking movements. AFHQ estimated that the Germans would elect to defend Italy south of Naples but would place only small forces in Calabria.⁶

Disintegrating Italian morale, the expectation of finding small enemy forces in Calabria, and the relatively light losses in landing craft during the invasion of Sicily prompted AFHQ to become somewhat bolder in its strategic thinking. Allied success achieved in Sicily as early as the first three days of operations gave rise to the hope that the British Eighth Army would sweep rapidly up the east coast to Messina, making unnecessary the commitment of the British 78th and 46th Infantry Divisions as planned. AFHQ decided to employ these divisions to gain lodgment in Calabria, and approved a plan called BAYTOWN, which was, in effect, an *ad hoc* BUTTRESS. This projected an assault on the tip of Calabria, in the Reggio area, five days after the capture of Messina, by a brigade of the British 13 Corps assisted by paratroopers and commandos. The 78th and 46th Divisions were then, soon afterward, to make an assault landing on the shore of the Gulf of Gioia.⁷

But the tenacious defense conducted by the Germans around Catania blocked the British sweep toward Messina, and in conformity with original plans the 78th Division was committed in Sicily. The formal BUTTRESS and GOBLET, plans to be executed by the British 10 and 5 Corps remained valid.⁸

In addition, AFHQ began seriously to consider alternative plans leading to a rapid build-up of forces in the Naples area--MUSTANG, a rapid overland drive from Calabria, and GANGWAY, a seaborne landing to reinforce those troops that had seized Naples after an overland advance. More important was Eisenhower's directive to General Clark, the U.S. Fifth Army commander, on 16 July: if the Allies landed in the toe, Clark and his army were to be ready not only to invade Sardinia but also "to support Italian mainland operations through Naples."⁹

On 17 July, after meeting with his chief subordinates, Tedder, Alexander, and Cunningham, General Eisenhower came to a major decision. He canceled the invasion of Sardinia in favor of operations on the Italian mainland, the best area for "achieving our object of forcing Italy out of the war and containing the maximum German forces." Though the situation had not sufficiently crystallized to permit informing the CCS precisely how the mainland was to be attacked or even the dates on which operations might be undertaken,

the commanders discussed, as suggested by the Combined Chiefs, the possibility of a direct amphibious assault on Naples. This appeared impractical for two reasons: Naples lay beyond the limit of effective land-based fighter support, and too few landing craft would be available for such an assault in addition to BUTTRESS and GOBLET. MUSKET, on the other hand, a plan to invade the heel near Taranto, now appeared feasible even though it had earlier been rejected. The unexpectedly light losses of landing craft in Sicily would compensate for the difficulty of furnishing air protection over the Taranto assault area. Eisenhower therefore instructed Clark to plan MUSKET as an alternative to GANGWAY, which was oriented on Naples.¹⁰

The crucial aspect of this project was the great distance of the Bay of Naples from the airfields which the Allies would be able to use--those in Sicily and those in Calabria to be seized in the initial attack on the mainland. Auxiliary aircraft carriers were not feasible for reinforcing land-based fighters because they could not launch modern fighters. In contrast, the Axis air forces, able to use airfields around Naples and Taranto, would have an extreme advantage. The P-39's (Airacobras) and P-40's (Kittyhawks) had short ranges. The P-38's (Lightnings) and A-36's (Mustangs) had the required range but lacked other desired characteristics. Spitfires, the best of the available fighters, if equipped with auxiliary ninety-gallon gasoline tanks, could reach the target areas but would not be able to operate over Naples for long. Only one aircraft carrier was operating in the Mediterranean, and this could not furnish enough planes to adequately support an amphibious operation.¹¹

Despite the problem of air cover, enthusiasm grew in Washington and London for a direct attack against the Naples area, with the American and British Chiefs united and drawn toward this bold course by the manifest weakness of Italian resistance. But the argument over the allotment of resources continued. The British wished to pour into an invasion of the Italian mainland everything that could be made available, the better to guarantee success. The Americans, while recognizing the opportunity for aggressive action, insisted on holding to the previous over-all decisions limiting Mediterranean resources so as to make possible operations in northwest Europe and the China-Burma-India Theater.¹²

Reports on disintegrating Italian morale continued to come in. In Greece and the Balkans at least five instances came to Allied attention of Italian commanders who indirectly approached British representatives attached to the patriot forces in Greece and in Yugoslavia. Italian war-weariness and a desire to come to terms seemed quite obvious from such overtures as well as from negotiations which some Italian officers were conducting with Mihailovitch, the Yugoslav Partisan leader. The Germans, appreciating clearly the danger of defection, had begun to occupy vital areas formerly held exclusively by Italians, thereby hoping to stiffen such areas, particularly those vulnerable to invasion. As the Allies continued in their conquest of Sicily and as the collapse of Italy seemed to draw ever nearer, the Allies believed that the Italian troops in the Balkans would remain passive except to defend against guerrilla attack; the Germans, in contrast, would remain staunch.¹³

With the benefit of such intelligence, the CCS came to partial agreement. On 20 July they approved General Eisenhower's decision to invade the Italian mainland, and then instructed him to extend his amphibious operations "northwards as shore-based fighter cover can be made effective."¹⁴

The British, however, were not satisfied. On the next day, 21 July, the British Chiefs wired their representatives in Washington that the "Italian will to continue the war may be within measurable distance of collapse." They urged immediate bold action, specifically an amphibious attack against Naples. A day later the British Chiefs went further. They provided a plan, code-named AVALANCHE, for such an invasion and suggested the last week of August as a favorable, if fleeting, moment. The prospect of success, they admitted, depended largely on the adequacy of air cover, and they proposed allotting Eisenhower four escort carriers and one large British carrier, plus about forty cargo vessels over and above the TRIDENT allocations. Until General Eisenhower indicated his requirements for an attack in the Naples area, the British Chiefs urged that orders be issued to stop the movement of forces away from the Mediterranean theater.¹⁵

The Americans did not consider additional resources necessary. AFHQ already had, they believed, sufficient means to take Naples, and, if not, "reasonable hazards could be accepted." They therefore proposed that the CCS instruct Eisenhower to prepare a plan, as a matter of urgency, for such an invasion, but using only the resources already made available for operations beyond Sicily. This meant an assault in the strength of about four divisions, as compared with the seven mounted for Sicily.¹⁶

The British were "most disappointed." The Sicilian Campaign, it seemed to them, was even stronger proof that Italy could be eliminated from the war. This, they believed, would increase the chances not only for a successful but a decisive cross-Channel attack into northwest Europe. Italian defeat the British regarded as the best if not the essential preliminary to the earliest possible defeat of Germany. And AVALANCHE, if feasible, was the best and quickest way to knock Italy out of the war.¹⁷

By this time AFHQ had made a formal study of the possibility of landing in the Naples area. General Rooks, the AFHQ G-3, on 24 July suggested the beaches fronting the Gulf of Salerno as the most suitable for an initial assault. He proposed that Clark's Fifth Army start planning the operation as an alternative to MUSKET, a landing near Taranto. He thought an assault force of about four divisions would be enough, if provision was made for rapid follow-up and build-up. He felt that the Allies should make their main effort and strike their first blow in Calabria, by means of BUTTRESS and GOBLET. If as the result of these operations the Allies held the toe of Italy by the beginning of October, they could go ahead and launch an invasion in the Naples area at Salerno.¹⁸

AFHQ's conservative and deliberate approach to an invasion of the Italian mainland changed radically because of a revolutionary event which occurred on the next day.

The Overthrow of Mussolini

Soon after the Italian delegation returned from the Feltre conference to Rome on 20 July, Mussolini told Ambrosio that he had decided to write a letter to Hitler to request termination of the alliance. Because Mussolini's abject behavior at Feltre had dispelled Ambrosio's last illusions that the Duce might break away from Germany, Ambrosio made a sharp rejoinder. The opportunity of the spoken word, Ambrosio said, had been lost at Feltre. Declaring that he could no longer collaborate in a policy that jeopardized the fate of

Italy, Ambrosio offered Mussolini his resignation. Mussolini refused to accept it and dismissed the chief of *Comando Supremo* from the room.¹⁹

At this time, arrangements began to take definite form in *Comando Supremo* for a *coup d'état* against the Duce as the essential step for getting Italy out of the war. Yet in a curiously inconsistent policy, Ambrosio made arrangements with OKW to reinforce the troops in Sicily. Either on 21 or 22 July, the decision was made to fight the campaign in Sicily to the limit. Formal assurance was made to OKW and the request forwarded for two additional German divisions. *Comando Supremo* promised to do all within its power to this end and Ambrosio asked that German coastal and antiaircraft artillery be shipped to the Messina Strait area immediately, and that the *29th Panzer Grenadier Division* be transferred from Calabria to Sicily.²⁰

The Germans replied on 22 July. The *29th Panzer Grenadier Division* would immediately be sent to Sicily.²¹ Two days later, Ambrosio conferred with Kesselring on getting more German divisions. Kesselring named the *305th* and *76th Infantry Divisions* as available. Both were in France but ready for transportation to Italy. Roatta had already discussed their commitment with Kesselring; he planned to place one in Calabria, the other in Puglia.²² Thus, while some Italians intrigued to get rid of Mussolini and the German alliance, others--in some instances the same ones--were permitting the Germans to tighten their military grip on Italy.

At the beginning of July 1943 there were still three distinct groups in Italy who were actively working and plotting for Mussolini's overthrow: dissident Fascists; the anti-Fascist opposition; and the military conspiracy. The dissident Fascists were led by Count Ciano and Dino Grandi. They were in touch with the Duke of Acquarone (the King's private secretary) and, through him, with the King. Their hope was to supplant Mussolini but to retain the Fascist system. The underground anti-Fascist parties were held together by Ivanoe Bonomi. Their minimum program was a complete overthrow of the Fascist system and an immediate return to the pre-Fascist, parliamentary system of government. General Castellano and the small group associated with him in *Comando Supremo* were, like the others, in frequent contact with Acquarone and waited only for the King to give the word. For this group, the questions of institutional changes were altogether secondary to the problem of terminating the war, but they wished the command of Italy's armed forces restored to the King in accordance with the *Statuto*.

All three groups thought alike with respect to the German alliance. Dino Grandi wished an immediate break of the alliance following Mussolini's dismissal, and a simultaneous approach to Great Britain for a separate peace. Bonomi advocated overtures to the Allies as soon as the new government was formed. Castellano's whole purpose in plotting against Mussolini was to permit Italy to make a quick and direct approach to the Western Powers to end the war.

Among the small groups who had access to the Royal Palace, it was known that the King was considering a change in the head of the government, but he had not yet definitely made up his mind. On 5 July he mentioned to his aide de camp, Generale di Divisione Paolo Puntoni, that Ambrosio was making preparations for the removal of Mussolini which would be followed by a military dictatorship headed by either Maresciallo d' Italia Enrico Caviglia or Marshal Badoglio. The King was not happy about either choice: he did not trust

Badoglio's character; he thought that Caviglia in power would mean a revival of freemasonry and rapprochement with the Anglo-Americans. Victor Emmanuel did not want to overthrow fascism at one stroke: he wished for gradual changes only. He recognized that Badoglio had a certain following among the masses which would be useful if Mussolini were dismissed. The King remarked to Puntoni that Ambrosio was undertaking too much and was having too many contacts outside military circles.²³

Alessandro Casati, an intimate of Bonomi, spoke with Acquarone on 12 July and learned that the King's private secretary was a gradualist, opposed to approaching the Allies at the same time that Mussolini was removed from power. Hoping to get Badoglio to change Acquarone's position, Casati and Bonomi had a long conversation with the marshal on 14 July. Badoglio agreed that denunciation of the alliance with Germany should immediately follow the formation of a new government. He agreed that the new government would need the support of all the anti-Fascist parties--Liberal, Christian, Democrat, Socialist, Communist, Actionist, and Democracy of Labor. He agreed with Bonomi that the proper solution was a politico-military cabinet that would eliminate fascism and break with Germany. He agreed to become the head of the prospective government and to name the military members of the cabinet while Bonomi selected the civil members and served as vice president. But he objected to Bonomi's desire for Della Torretta as Foreign Minister, insisting instead on Raffaele Guariglia, Ambassador to Turkey. Bonomi acceded on this point after some heated argument.²⁴

At an audience with the King on 15 July, Badoglio presented a proposal for a new government under himself and the inclusion of Bonomi and other politicians in the cabinet. The King seemed to be decidedly averse to the proposal. He said he did not want any politicians. The men whom Badoglio proposed were all old, the King said, and they would simply give the appearance of a return to the pre-Fascist system. Unwilling to admit that he was even thinking of moving against Mussolini, Victor Emmanuel remarked that prearranged coups had little chance of success, particularly in Italy where people were not accustomed to keeping secrets. He terminated the audience without coming to a decision.

Two days later, when Badoglio discussed with Bonomi and Casati the royal reception of his idea, he was only lukewarm on the feasibility of forming a government based on party support. Either the King would accept the Badoglio-Bonomi proposal, said the marshal, or else he, Badoglio, would withdraw the suggestion, thereby letting everyone resume his liberty of action. Sometime during the next few days, he sent personal and unofficial representatives to Switzerland to inform the British Government that he desired to make contact with the Western Allies.²⁵

On 18 July, Acquarone let it be known that the King was preparing to act against Mussolini but that he wanted the new cabinet to consist of nonpolitical civil servants. Bonomi was greatly alarmed. The mere dismissal of Mussolini would leave the problem of the war and the German alliance unsolved. Calling on Badoglio on 20 July, Casati and Bonomi learned that Badoglio had been won over to the course of gradualism favored by Acquarone and the King. To warn the sovereign that gradualism would not solve the pressing problems of breaking the alliance and getting out of the war, Bonomi and Casati on 22 July submitted a memorandum to Acquarone. The memorandum was prescient though without effect. It pointed out that Germany would have no doubt of Italy's real intentions once Mussolini was eliminated from power; that a gradualist policy would give Germany time to prepare for

action against a new Italian Government; that a cabinet of civil servants devoid of political tendencies would be viewed as an enemy by Fascists, yet would find no support in the anti-Fascist circles; that the Anglo-American coalition would not be favorably disposed to such a cabinet because it would lack men of guaranteed anti-Fascist reputations; that in choosing politicians representing the people the King would follow custom, but in appointing civil servants he would draw upon himself the responsibility for the policies of that cabinet.²⁶

Badoglio had several conversations with Ambrosio, who brought him up to date on the military situation and who carefully explained that Italy's position toward Germany excluded a unilateral Italian declaration of withdrawal from the war because Italy had insufficient forces to back up an immediate breach of the alliance. Badoglio cautioned Ambrosio to do nothing without the express approval of the King. But in one of their discussions attended by Acquarone, they agreed that two things were necessary for the good of the country: to arrest Mussolini and half a dozen leading Fascist officials; and to use the Regular Army to neutralize the force of the Fascist militia. Acquarone carefully reported this discussion to the King.²⁷

On 20 July, under the impact of Mussolini's failure at Feltre and of the American bombing of Rome, the King made up his mind to act. He told Puntoni: "It is necessary at all costs to make a change. The thing is not easy, however, for two reasons: first, our disastrous military situation, and second, the presence of the Germans in Italy." Two days later Victor Emmanuel apparently tried to induce Mussolini to offer his resignation. There was a long discussion between the Duce and the King who subsequently told Puntoni:

I tried to make the Duce understand that now it is only his person, the target of enemy propaganda and the focal point of public opinion, which impedes an internal revival and which prevents a clear definition of our military situation. He did not understand and he did not wish to understand. It was as if I had spoken to the wind.²⁸

Through Acquarone, the sovereign informed General Castellano that he had made up his mind to appoint Badoglio as Mussolini's successor. All preparations for the change in regime would have to be completed within six or seven days. Acquarone said that Mussolini had an audience scheduled with the King for 26 July, and Castellano made plans to have the Duce arrested shortly after that event.²⁹

Another critical step was to protect the new government against a reaction by the Fascist militia. *Comando Supremo* therefore moved the *10th (Piave) Motorized Infantry Division* and the *135th (Ariete) Armored Division* to the Rome area, both to constitute a special corps under General Carboni. An intimate of Count Ciano and at the same time of Castellano, Carboni was ambitious. Though he had at times been a difficult subordinate, he was strongly anti-German and pro-Ally.³⁰ No measures were planned in advance against a possible German reaction. The King intended neither to create an immediate rupture in the Axis alliance nor to make an immediate approach to the Western Powers.

As for Badoglio, in deciding to accept the high office, he acted with a soldierly sense of duty toward his sovereign. Whatever course the King wished to follow, Badoglio made clear that he, Badoglio, would execute. If the King commanded continuance of the war in alliance with Germany, Badoglio would loyally carry out that policy. If the King directed

an approach to the Allies, Badoglio would undertake that course. The responsibility, Badoglio also made clear, would remain with the King.³¹

Victor Emmanuel was not happy to have the responsibility placed on his royal person, and he almost regretted the imminent change. Things were much easier with Mussolini, he thought, who was very clever and who took responsibility upon himself. The appointment of Badoglio meant, not a return to pre-Fascist constitutional procedures, but a return to absolute monarchy. While Mussolini as *Capo del Governo* claimed for that office all the power he could grasp, Badoglio deliberately restricted himself to the role of the King's executive secretary.³²

Curiously enough, Mussolini himself helped set the stage for his overthrow. Early in July, Carlo Scorza, the new Fascist party secretary, had planned a series of mass meetings in the principal cities of Italy and invited leading Fascists to exhort the people to determined resistance. Largely at Dino Grandi's instigation, quite a few party officials refused the invitation. Several of these men saw Mussolini on 16 July, expressed their dissatisfaction with the situation, and proposed convening the Grand Council of Fascism, which had not met for more than three years. Surprisingly enough, five days later, on 21 July, after returning from the Feltre conference, Mussolini called the Fascist Grand Council to a meeting on 24 July.³³

Aware of the King's intention to oust Mussolini, Grandi skillfully lined up a majority of the council members against the Duce. He drew up a resolution calling for the King to resume command of the armed forces. Some members signed it in the belief that it would merely force Mussolini to relinquish the military power he had exercised since the beginning of the war. Grandi and others hoped that a majority vote favoring his resolution would be taken as a lack of confidence in Mussolini's leadership and would induce the King to replace Mussolini by a triumvirate: Grandi, Ciano, and Federzoni (president of the Royal Academy).³⁴

The Grand Council of 28 members met at 1700, Saturday, 24 July. The debate on Grandi's resolution lasted almost nine hours. Around 0300, 25 July, Mussolini acceded to Grandi's demand for a vote. Of the 28 members, many of whom had remained silent during the course of the debate, 19 voted with Grandi against Mussolini.³⁵

Neither Mussolini nor Grandi immediately realized what had happened. The Grand Council meeting was but a sideshow designed to furnish an appropriate occasion, a constitutional crisis, for dismissing the Head of Government. When Mussolini saw the King after the fateful poll, he told the monarch that the Grand Council vote did not require his resignation. The King would not listen. Coldly he told Mussolini that he had to resign--Marshal Badoglio would take his place. On leaving the palace, Mussolini was unable to find his car. Accepting the help of a *carabinieri* officer, he was escorted into an ambulance and whisked away. Not until later did he realize that he was under arrest.³⁶

Grandi hung around all day waiting to be called to an appointment in the new cabinet. Like Bonomi, he believed in making immediate contact with the Allies, and to this end he sought permission to leave for Spain at once. Grandi wished to talk to the British Ambassador at Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, whom Grandi had known when he was Mussolini's Ambassador to London. But Grandi had already played the part deftly assigned to him by Acquarone,

and Grandi cooled his heels in Rome. Not until several weeks passed did the new government permit Grandi to go to Madrid, but without instructions, credentials, or power.³⁷ As it turned out, Grandi's trip proved to be of value, but as a red herring, for the Germans, who were hot on Grandi's trail, failed to pick up the scent of the official mission dispatched to make contact with the Allies.

The meeting of the Fascist Grand Council on 24 July gave the Roman public a sense of the political crisis. When news of Mussolini's dismissal raced through the city on 25 July, people embraced each other in joy, danced in the streets, and paraded in gratitude to the King. Mobs attacked Fascist party offices. Fascist symbols were torn down.

With one stroke the House of Savoy had removed the great incubus that had brought Italy into the war on the losing side, and everyone expected the new government to bring about an immediate peace. Never was a people's faith in royalty destined to be more bitterly disappointed.

No one paid much attention to the Germans, who disappeared from public view.³⁸

Allied Reaction

The overthrow of Mussolini took the Allies by surprise. At the TRIDENT Conference the Americans had argued that the Allies might bring about the collapse of Italy without invading the Italian mainland. The conquest of Sicily and intensified aerial bombardment of the mainland, they believed, might be enough. The British felt that only an invasion of the Italian mainland would guarantee Italian surrender, and this course of action had become the basic Allied concept--continuing ground force operations beyond Sicily in order to knock Italy out of the war.

The U.S. Department of State had as yet scarcely discussed the peace terms to be imposed upon a vanquished Italy. On 26 July, if it had been necessary, the Allies would have found it impossible to state their basic terms for peace--aside from unconditional surrender.

The Allies even lacked a set of armistice terms for an Italy offering to surrender. They had discussed this matter but without reaching agreement. The British had proposed a long and detailed list of conditions to be imposed upon a defeated Italy. The Americans had not concurred because the British list did not mean total surrender. They had instead proposed a series of diplomatic instruments to obtain unconditional surrender and allow the extension of Allied military government over the whole of Italian territory. Differences in ultimate objectives effectively hindered Anglo-American agreement. The Americans had no qualms about putting the House of Savoy into protective custody and undertaking the political reconstruction of the country. To the British, the prospect of another dynasty going into discard was too painful to contemplate. Transatlantic discussions were continuing without definite conclusions when the developments on the Tiber made a decision vital.

Contradictory crosscurrents further complicated the discussions. The troublesome Italian Fleet had aroused British passion for revenge, and Churchill's and Eden's bitter experiences with Mussolini made them endorse a complete Italian surrender. American feeling against

Mussolini had never reached a boiling point; the U.S. Government had no wish to gain territory at Italian expense, and a significant element in the American electorate was of Italian descent or origin and could not be ignored. These factors exerted a moderating influence on U.S. policy.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff held a special meeting on 26 July, the day after Mussolini's overthrow; greatly elated by the news, they reached a decision of some import. Though the Americans refused to alter their stand on resources for an attack on Naples, they did not object when the British added one heavy and four escort carriers to the Mediterranean resources. The CCS agreed to expedite the elimination of Italy from the war by authorizing Eisenhower to launch AVALANCHE at the earliest possible date and with the resources available to him.³⁹

In Tunis, also heartened by word of Mussolini's downfall, Eisenhower was meeting with his principal subordinates to review the new situation. They decided that promising conditions called for a bolder course of action. Upon receipt of the CCS directive authorizing an invasion in the Naples area, Eisenhower ordered Clark to draw detailed plans for executing AVALANCHE. He also instructed Clark to prepare one division to sail directly into Naples and seize the port in conjunction with an airborne operation. Sensing the prospects of securing a speedy capitulation of the Italian Government, Eisenhower looked forward to occupying rapidly key points on the Italian mainland with Italian consent.⁴⁰

By this time, Allied intelligence reports of Italian morale in the battle for Sicily were caustic. One stated:

For the most part the Italian field formations have not shown a standard of morale and battle determination very much higher than that of the coastal units whose performance was so lamentably low. . . . Sheer war weariness and a feeling of the hopelessness of Italy's position have, however, obviously been more potent influences and these have moreover permeated the field army to a considerable degree, with the result that a sense of inferiority and futility has destroyed its zest and spirit.⁴¹

To exploit the new political situation and Italian war weariness, General Eisenhower decided to pull all the stops on the organ of psychological warfare. If he could, by offering a simple set of armistice terms, eliminate Italy as a belligerent, the Allies would be able to use Italian territory in the war against Germany.

Therefore, Eisenhower asked CCS approval of a radio message he proposed to broadcast constantly to the Italian people. He wished to commend the Italians and the Royal House for ridding themselves of Mussolini; to assure them that they could have peace on honorable conditions; to promise Italy the advantages of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms and also a voice in the final negotiations for world peace; to suggest that if the King remained at war with the Allies much longer, British and American odium concentrated on Mussolini would be transferred to the monarch, thereby making an honorable surrender difficult. The radio broadcasts, Eisenhower proposed, should urge the King to make immediate contact with the Allied commander in chief.⁴²

General Eisenhower also drafted a set of armistice terms:

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces with disarmament as dictated by the C-in-C, and a guarantee by the Italian Government that German forces now on the Italian mainland will immediately comply with all provisions of this document.
2. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the C-in-C, and none of these may, from the beginning of these negotiations, be evacuated to Germany.
3. Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet to such points as may be designated by the C-in-C Med., with details of disarmament and conduct to be prescribed by him.
4. Immediate evacuation from all Italian territory of the German Air Force.
5. Immediate beginning of the evacuation of German land forces from the Italian mainland on phase lines to be so prescribed by the Allied C-in-C that the evacuation from all Italy will be complete within one month. German forces in Sicily are not affected by this armistice and will either surrender unconditionally or will be destroyed.
6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory, both islands and mainland, to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.
7. Immediate acknowledgment of the overriding authority of the Allied Commander-in-Chief to establish military government and with the unquestioned right to effect, through such agencies as he may set up, any changes in personnel that may seem to him desirable.
8. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until the function is taken over by the Allies.
9. Immediate withdrawal of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may now be engaged.
10. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.⁴³

General Eisenhower proposed that this set of terms serve as the basis for a CCS directive, and that it also be broadcast to Italy. Knowledge of the terms and the assurances therein of honorable conditions of peace, he believed, would make the Italian population force the government to sue for an armistice. He did not envisage the active co-operation of Italian troops in the war beyond the enforcement of German withdrawal from Italian soil, for he believed that "they would deem it completely dishonorable to attempt to turn definitely against their former allies and compel the surrender of German formations now in the mainland of Italy."⁴⁴ His terms were an attempt to meet an Italian request for armistice before an Allied invasion of the mainland, and he made no mention of unconditional surrender.⁴⁵

Neither did President Roosevelt urge the unconditional surrender formula when he heard the news of Mussolini's downfall. Cabling Churchill immediately, he suggested that if the Italian Government made overtures for peace, the Allies ought to come as close to unconditional surrender as possible and then follow that capitulation with good treatment of the Italian people. Roosevelt thought it essential to gain the use of all Italian territory, the

transportation system and airfields as well, for the further prosecution of the war against the Germans in the Balkans and elsewhere in Europe. He wished provision made for the surrender of Mussolini, "the head devil," and his chief associates, and he asked the Prime Minister for his views on the new situation.⁴⁶

As Minister of Defence and with the approval of his War Cabinet, Mr. Churchill sent the President his proposals on how to deal with a defeated Italy. Considering it very likely that the dissolution of the Fascist system would soon follow Mussolini's overthrow, Churchill expected the King and Badoglio to try to arrange a separate armistice with the Allies. In this case, he urged that every possible advantage be sought from the surrender to expedite the destruction of Hitler and Nazi Germany.⁴⁷

The text of Churchill's proposals reached AFHQ soon after Eisenhower had dispatched his draft of terms to the CCS. Both sets of terms were closely similar. Both required the use of all Italian territory; insisted on control of the Italian Fleet; stipulated the return of prisoners of war to prevent their transfer to Germany; demanded the withdrawal of the Italian armed forces from further participation in the war against the Allies; and assumed that the Italians on Italian soil would be able to enforce German compliance with the terms of surrender.

There were some differences. Using phraseology originally suggested by Roosevelt, Churchill called for the surrender of Mussolini and the leading Fascists as war criminals. Churchill thought of gaining the active aid of Italy's armed forces against the Germans. If the Italian Fleet and Army came under Allied control by the armistice, the Prime Minister apparently would have been willing to acquiesce in the retention of sovereignty by the Italian Government (the monarchy) on the mainland. Eisenhower, in contrast, wished not only the power to establish military government but also an overriding authority over the Italian Government with power to appoint and dismiss officials.

Eisenhower on 27 July explained to the CCS why he preferred his own conditions to Churchill's. He wished to have a simple set of terms that could be broadcast directly to the Italian people. Hope for an honorable peace among the population, he thought, would make it impossible for any government in Italy to remain in power if it declined to make peace. But he did not wish to ask Italy to turn against the Germans, for he doubted the existence of much "fury" among the Italian people. Requiring active aid against the Germans would be offering the Italians merely a change of sides, whereas the great desire of the Italian people, he felt, was to be finished with the war.⁴⁸

Eisenhower's program of psychological warfare, designed to bring the Badoglio regime to prompt capitulation, came under close scrutiny and eventual change by the heads of the British and American Governments. On the same afternoon, 27 July, that Eisenhower renewed his recommendation for a simple set of terms, the Prime Minister, in the House of Commons, was making the first official public declaration in response to Mussolini's downfall. Churchill said:

We should let the Italians, to use a homely phrase, stew in their own juice for a bit, and hot up the fire to the utmost in order to accelerate the process, until we obtain from their Government, or whoever possesses the necessary authority, all our indispensable requirements for carrying on the war against our prime and capital foe, which is not Italy

but Germany. It is the interest of Italy, and also the interest of the Allies, that the unconditional surrender of Italy be brought about wholesale and not piecemeal.⁴⁹

As he explained to Eisenhower privately, Churchill saw "obvious dangers in trying to state armistice terms in an attractive, popular form to the enemy nation." It was far better, he said, for all to be "cut and dried and that their Government should know our full demands and their maximum expectations."⁵⁰ On the following day, 28 July, President Roosevelt in a public address reiterated the strong stand to be taken with Italy. He said:

Our terms for Italy are still the same as our terms to Germany and Japan--'Unconditional Surrender.' We will have no truck with Fascism in any way, shape, or manner. We will permit no vestige of Fascism to remain.⁵¹

The arguments seemed to be a luxury in view of the immediate prospect of getting Italy to surrender, and General Marshall explained the difficulty involved. The British Government, he telegraphed Eisenhower, had the attitude that a surrender involved political and economic conditions as well as military stipulations. The British therefore viewed Eisenhower's authority as limited to purely local surrenders. And the President agreed that the Allied commander should not fix general terms without the approval of both governments.⁵²

Eisenhower replied by asking for a directive from both governments empowering him to state general terms. There might be, he wrote, a fleeting opportunity to gain all objectives. Most important, he felt, was the prospect of obtaining Italian co-operation in seizing vital ports and airfields. But he had to be able to speak precisely and authoritatively to the commander in chief of the Italian forces. If economic and political matters could be settled later, he might by the use of military terms alone be able to bring the campaign in the Mediterranean to a rapid conclusion, thus saving resources for operations elsewhere.⁵³

At the same time, he sent a message to Mr. Churchill, explaining his request for a directive on a slightly different ground. Because he was conducting the war in the Mediterranean in accord with the CCS instruction to force Italy out of the war, he felt it his duty to take quick and full advantage of every opportunity.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office on 27 July had informed the U.S. State Department that the British considered the King of Italy or Badoglio acceptable for the purpose of effecting surrender. What continued to be a problem was whether the surrendering authority should be permitted to continue in office.⁵⁵

The Combined Civil Affairs Committee took up the surrender matter on 29 July, but was unable to reach a decision or to make any positive recommendations. The British representative urged that the earlier proposal, the lengthy draft of detailed conditions known as the Long Terms, be approved by both governments so that General Eisenhower could present civil as well as military terms. The Americans objected, as they had previously, on the ground that the Long Terms did not provide for unconditional surrender.⁵⁶

On the same day, the British Defense Committee cabled its views to the CCAC. Unconditional surrender, the British believed, had political and economic, as well as military, connotations. The armistice terms should therefore be comprehensive and

inclusive. They recommended that General Eisenhower be authorized to accept a general surrender, but urged that the Long Terms be used as the surrender instrument. Considering it rather unlikely for the Italians to approach General Eisenhower directly, they anticipated as more probable an Italian bid for peace through the Vatican or some neutral state. The proposal to secure an initial surrender on the basis of military terms, this to be followed by agreement to economic and political terms, struck the British as faulty. What if the Italian Government refused to sign at the second stage? Precise terms were needed, and civil as well as military conditions would have to be included. And toward that end, the British planned in the near future to submit to the U.S. Government a comprehensive draft of terms in the expectation that the two Allied governments would reach agreement in plenty of time for AFHQ to conduct the actual negotiations.⁵⁷

At this juncture President Roosevelt, though concurring in the British view that the precise armistice terms should not be broadcast, urged that General Eisenhower's recommended draft of surrender articles be accepted.⁵⁸ He seemed mainly impressed by Eisenhower's argument that great military gains would accrue at little cost if a simple set of terms of surrender could be used to secure the rapid elimination of Italy from the war. Thus, although he had publicly proclaimed his adherence to unconditional surrender, and although he had left the American members of the CCAC with the impression that he was standing by that formula, he did not mention the phrase in his correspondence with Churchill. Furthermore, he recognized that insisting on having Mussolini turned over as a war criminal might prejudice the primary objective of getting Italy quickly out of the war, and he did not recommend a modification of Eisenhower's draft on this point.⁵⁹

As Mr. Roosevelt explained to the press, he did not care with whom he dealt in Italy so long as that person--King, prime minister, or a mayor--was not a member of the Fascist government; so long as he could get the Italian troops to lay down their arms; and so long as he could prevent anarchy. At the same time, the President warned neutral nations against sheltering Axis war criminals.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, the British and American Governments had approved an emasculated version of Eisenhower's draft message to be broadcast to the Italian people. References to the Atlantic Charter and to peace conditions were dropped. The return to Italy of Italian prisoners captured in Tunisia and Sicily was promised if all Allied prisoners held by the Italians were repatriated. On 29 July, therefore, AFHQ began to transmit the following broadcast to Italy:

We commend the Italian people and the House of Savoy on ridding themselves of Mussolini, the man who involved them in war as the tool of Hitler, and brought them to the verge of disaster. The greatest obstacle which divided the Italian people from the United Nations has been removed by the Italians themselves. The only remaining obstacle on the road to peace is the German aggressor who is still on Italian soil. You want peace. You can have peace immediately, and peace under the honorable conditions which our governments have already offered you. We are coming to you as liberators. Your part is to cease immediately any assistance to the German military forces in your country. If you do this, we will rid you of the Germans and deliver you from the horrors of war. As you have already seen in Sicily, our occupation will be mild and beneficent. Your men will return to their normal life, and to their productive avocations and, provided all British and Allied prisoners now in your hands are restored safely to us, and not taken away to Germany, the

hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners captured by us in Tunisia and Sicily, will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them. The ancient liberties and traditions of your country will be restored.⁶¹

The day this broadcast hit Italy, 29 July, Hitler was directing the new division for Rommel's *Army Group B* to make their way across the borders into Italy through use of force if necessary. Roatta, chief of the Italian Army, was drafting instruction to commanders in northern Italy to mine the railways against German incursion. Guariglia, the new Foreign Minister, had just returned to Rome where rumors were current of an impending German descent upon the capital in force. In Sicily where the U.S. Seventh and British Eighth Armies were pressing forward vigorously all along the line, Italian resistance had virtually collapsed. Throughout Italy the population expected Badoglio to bring about an end to the war. Though the Badoglio government banned Eisenhower's broadcast from publication, the message in mimeographed form quickly appeared on the streets of the principal cities, where it became the chief topic of discussion in street cars and cafes. According to one competent observer, the Allied broadcast was the straw that broke the camel's back.⁶²

As Churchill and Roosevelt clearly wished, the psychological warfare beamed to Italy from the Allied headquarters in Algiers was sharply differentiated from the problem of agreeing on suitable articles of capitulation. There was a difficult problem regarding armistice terms, General Marshall telegraphed General Eisenhower on the 28th, because the attitude of the British Government was that political and economic conditions were involved as well as strictly military stipulations. Meeting on 30 July, the British War Cabinet agreed to accept Eisenhower's draft conditions for Italian capitulation, subject to several amendments. The British wished to omit all references to German forces and to add a stipulation that the Italians must do their best to deny to the Germans facilities useful to the Allies. They proposed to augment Eisenhower's power by enabling him to order the Italian Government to take such administrative or other action as he might require--this in addition to his authority to establish military government. They wanted greater clarity in spelling out the power to prescribe demobilization, disarmament, and demilitarization. They wanted provision made for the surrender of Italian war criminals, and for the disposition of Italian merchant shipping. With these changes, the cabinet was willing to authorize Eisenhower's terms as an emergency arrangement--if the Italians suddenly sued for peace and if military developments required immediate acceptance. If it turned out that the Allies had time to negotiate through diplomatic channels, the British desired the Americans to give careful consideration to the formal set of articles--the Long Terms--proposed earlier by the British.⁶³

On the following day, the last day of July, the President and Prime Minister approved the short military terms. Nothing was to be said about war criminals, for Roosevelt believed that problem might better be taken up later. Churchill suggested two changes of wording for the sake of precision; emphasized his government's agreement to the short terms only to meet an emergency situation; and revealed that London found puzzling Washington's lack of reference to the original British terms, a comprehensive and more carefully worded version of the armistice terms.⁶⁴

On the same day Churchill suggested to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that concluding an armistice with Italy in two stages--initially the short military terms, later the signature of the long terms--might be a sound procedure. Even in the event of a diplomatic approach,

Churchill felt, the military conditions might serve very well, for the short terms would be more easily understood by an Italian envoy. The British Foreign Office was not particularly receptive to Churchill's thought. Eden preferred unconditional surrender.⁶⁵

General Eisenhower now had, by the end of July, a draft of armistice terms ready for presentation to Badoglio if the latter should seek to get out of the war, as he was expected to do. But it was still not clear between London and Washington what should happen to the Italian Government after acceptance of the short terms. President Roosevelt studied the British draft of comprehensive terms, but he did not wish to use it. He wired this view to Churchill: that in the future he preferred to let Eisenhower act to meet situations as they might arise. A copy of this message was given to the American Joint Chiefs and to the British Joint Staff Mission for their guidance. At the same time, in deference to Churchill's inquiries, President Roosevelt directed the Joint Chiefs to re-examine the British draft of the Long Terms.⁶⁶

On 3 August, the Joint Chiefs again studied the Long Terms, the British proposal which had first been considered in the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting of 16 June. The Joint Chiefs submitted four objections to the British proposal: there was no statement or reference to unconditional surrender; it referred to the "Supreme Command of the United Nations," a position which did not exist; the document did not deal with German troops in Italy; and it provided for implementation by a Control Commission under the authority of the United Nations, rather than by Eisenhower under the authority of the United States and British Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs expressed agreement with President Roosevelt's view that Eisenhower be permitted to act to meet situations as they arose, using the terms already furnished him as he saw fit. They conceded that the British proposal, with appropriate amendments to meet U.S. objections, might serve a useful purpose for later phases of the Italian situation, since it did embrace in a single document many well-considered military, political, and economic conditions to be imposed on Italy.⁶⁷

The British Government now reintroduced its draft of the Long Terms, with changes of wording to meet the American objections, particularly in regard to unconditional surrender.⁶⁸ At its fourth meeting, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee again considered terms for Italian surrender. The British members presented the British War Cabinet's point of view: a comprehensive and all-inclusive statement of terms would be necessary in addition to the terms which General Eisenhower already possessed and they submitted the revised and amended British draft of the Long Terms for this purpose. The committee agreed that additional terms dealing with political and economic matters would be necessary at a later date. The American members pointed out that the short terms did not include any saving clause empowering General Eisenhower to impose the political as well as military conditions. The committee then recommended the inclusion of such a saving clause. No other decision was made.⁶⁹

On 6 August, the Combined Chiefs accepted the committee's suggestion for a saving clause, and instructed General Eisenhower that if he employed the draft terms which he already had, he should make it clear that they were purely military and that other conditions, political, economic, and financial, would follow.⁷⁰

Mussolini's downfall, therefore, marked no turning point in Allied strategy. It merely hastened the decision to invade the Italian mainland, but it in no sense brought about the decision itself. At American insistence, operations in the Mediterranean beyond Sicily were to be limited--subordinate to the main effort to be launched later in northwest Europe. With his resources consequently curtailed, General Eisenhower was to find that the success or failure in the campaign after Sicily would depend not on the power marshalled in support of the invasion but rather on negotiations to eliminate Italy as a belligerent. The blow at the Italian mainland, originally conceived as a means of forcing the Italians to surrender, was to become contingent on first eliminating Italy from the war as the result of military diplomacy.

Rome: Open City

During the last few days of July, while working out the terms of military diplomacy to induce Italy to quit the war, while broadcasting to the Italian people a program of psychological warfare, and while expecting word from the Badoglio government on the prospect of peace, General Eisenhower had suspended heavy air raids on Italian cities. The lull coincidentally served another purpose. The Mediterranean Allied air forces had been operating at close to full capacity for a long time, and air commanders wished to give their crews a rest.⁷¹

On the first day of August, after conferring with Tedder, Eisenhower decided to resume air bombardments, particularly in the Naples area and on the railroad marshaling yards around Rome. Before doing so, he broadcast his intention a day earlier. Another Algiers radio broadcast on 2 August warned the Italian people of dire consequences if the Badoglio government made no move to end the war.⁷²

The Allied air forces then bombed the Italian mainland. U.S. Flying Fortresses attacked Naples twice, night-flying British Wellingtons raided Naples three times during the first week of August. An operation planned against the Rome marshaling yards for 3 August was canceled at the last minute because AFHQ received word from the Combined Chiefs that the Italian Government had requested a statement of conditions necessary to recognize Rome as an open city.⁷³

The Italian attempt to gain for Rome the status of an open city was the first diplomatic approach received by the Allies. The initiative apparently had come from the Holy See, for on 31 July the Vatican received in response to its request, a written statement from the Italian Government that the decision had been made to declare Rome an open city. Transmitting this information, the Apostolic Delegate in Washington informed Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, on 2 August that the Papal Secretary of State wished to ascertain what conditions the Allies deemed necessary for regarding the Italian capital in this light. The State Department informed the British Government and General Marshall, and the latter advised Eisenhower, suggesting that air bombardment of Rome be halted for the moment. It was then that General Eisenhower canceled the bombardment planned for 3 August. Next day Eisenhower learned that he was free to attack airfields near Rome being used by Italians and Germans, but bad flying weather around the Italian capital caused him to cancel the mission.⁷⁴

The War Department, meanwhile, on 2 August had submitted to the President and to the State Department a list of seven conditions considered essential for recognizing Rome as an open city. Churchill and his War Cabinet vigorously opposed such recognition.

Apprehensive lest such a move be taken by the Allied public as an abandonment of the principle of unconditional surrender and as a willingness to make a patched-up peace with the Badoglio regime, Churchill also suspected that the Italian Government might be taking the first step toward trying to secure recognition of all of Italy as a neutral area so that the government could withdraw painlessly from the war. Believing that Allied troops would be in Rome within a few months, Churchill saw the city's communication and airfield systems as a requirement for further advance up the Italian peninsula.⁷⁵

Though agreeing with the Prime Minister's objections, the JCS recommended that the President avoid making a direct denial to the Holy See's request. In accordance with the suggestion, Mr. Sumner Welles on 5 August told the Apostolic Delegate that the matter was receiving the fullest consideration by the highest American authorities. He concluded: "I am instructed by the President to state that, in accordance with the accepted principles of international law and of pertinent international agreements, there is nothing to prevent the Italian Government from undertaking unilaterally to declare Rome an open city."⁷⁶

The first diplomatic move made by Italy toward the Allies, tentative and tangential though it was, thus received an *ad hoc* reception that was rather cold. Without further communication, the Italian Government on 14 August formally declared Rome an open city. At first the CCS instructed Eisenhower to make no further air attacks against the Italian capital until its status could be clarified. But on the following day, 15 August, the CCS decided that the Allies should not commit themselves on the matter, and they thereby left Eisenhower free to bomb such military objectives in the Rome area as he judged necessary.⁷⁷

Footnotes

1. Memo, G-3 AFHQ for AFHQ CofS, 1 Jun 43, sub: Opns After HUSKY, 0100/12C/534,II; AFHQ Directive to Comdrs of Naval, Ground, and Air Forces, 5 Jun 43, 0100/12C/534,II

For details of planning the invasion of Italy prior to the evolvment of AVALANCHE, see Martin Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. See also Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1934-1944*, pp. 152-61, 245-46.

2. Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 250, 29 Jun 43, printed in Alexander, *Allied Armies in Italy*, vol. I, pp. 60-63.

3. CCS 268/2, Post-HUSKY Opns North African Theater, Rpt by Combined Staff Planners, 15 Jul 43.

4. Min, 192d Mtg CCS, 16 Jul 43, Supplementary Min, item 6.

5. AFHQ G-2 Weekly Intel Sum 46, 12 Jul 43, and AFHQ G-2 Weekly Intel Sum 47, 20 Jul 43, both in job 9, reel 23A. See also Telg 1783, AFHQ G-2 to TROOPERS, and 5110 to AGWAR, 17 Jul 43, job 24, reel 118D.

- [6.](#) JIC (A) 13/43, JIC Algiers Estimate of German Intentions in the South of Italy, 12 Jul 43, job 26, reel 73, Special.
- [7.](#) Min of Third Weekly Exec Planning Sec, 14 Jul 43, item 22, job 61C, reel 183C; Alexander, *Allied Armies in Italy*, vol. I, p. 10; Eisenhower, Italian Dispatch, p. 8.
- [8.](#) Eisenhower, Italian Dispatch, p. 10; Memo, AFHQ for multiple addressees, 25 Jun 43, sub: Chain of Command for, and Channels of Communication for Mounting, Opns BRIMSTONE, BUTTRESS and GOBLET, 0100/12C/534,II; Ltr, MIDEAST to AFHQ, 15 Jul 43, sub: BUTTRESS and GOBLET Order of Battle, same file.
- [9.](#) Directive, CofS AFHQ to CG Fifth Army, sub: Opns on Italian Mainland, 16 Jul 43, Fifth Army Rcds, KCRC, Opn GANGWAY, cabinet 196, drawer 4.
- [10.](#) Rcd of Mtg at La Marsa, 1430, 17 Jul 43, job 26A, reel 225B; Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 265, 18 Jul 43, Salmon Files, 5-B-1 (NAF, 1 Jun 43-31 Dec 43); Directive, Maj. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley, DCofS AFHQ, to CG Fifth Army, sub: Opns on Italian Mainland, 22 Jul 43, printed in Alexander, *Allied Armies in Italy*, vol. I, pp. 66-67. The outline plan for Operation MUSKET (AFHQ P/96 Final, 24 Jul 43) is found in job 10A, reel 13C.
- [11.](#) Notes on the Air Implications of an Assault on Italian Mainland--Naples Area, 25 Jul 43, printed in Alexander, *Allied Armies in Italy*, vol. I, pp. 68-71. See also Craven and Cate, eds., vol. II, *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK*, [pp. 489-91](#).
- [12.](#) CCS 268/3, sub: Post-HUSKY Opns North African Theater, Memo by the Representatives of British Chiefs of Staff, 19 Jul 43, ABC 384 Post-HUSKY (14 May 43), Sec. 3; Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, [pp. 158-60](#); Bryant, *The Turn of The Tide*, pp. 549-51.
- [13.](#) Telg, MIDEAST to TROOPERS, repeated to FREEDOM, sub: Enemy Morale in the Balkans, 1/83652, 19 Jul 43, job 24, reel 188D. Cf. Butcher, *My Three Years With Eisenhower*, p. 274 (entry for 2 Aug 43).
- [14.](#) CCS 268/4, 20 Jul 43, sub: Post-HUSKY Opns North African Theater, Rpt by Combined Staff Planners, 20 Jul 43; Min, 97th Mtg JCS, 20 Jul 43, item 12; Telg, CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 169, 20 Jul 43, Salmon Files, 5-B-1.
- [15.](#) CCS 268/6, 21 Jul 43, sub: Post-HUSKY Opns North African Theater, Memo by Representatives of British Chiefs of Staff; CCS 268/7, 22 Jul 43, sub: Post-HUSKY Opns North African Theater, Msg From British Chiefs of Staff.
- [16.](#) Min, 103d Mtg CCS, 23 Jul 43, Supplement, item 7.
- [17.](#) CCS 268/8, sub: Post-HUSKY Opns North African Theater, Memo by Representatives of British Chiefs of Staff, 24 Jul 43.
- [18.](#) AFHQ P/98 (Final), 24 Jul 43, sub: Appreciation of an Amphibious Assault Against the Naples Area, job 10A, reel 13C.

19. MS #P-058, Project 46, 1 Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 4; Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 56-57; Radoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, p. 65.

20. Ltr, Ambrosio to Rintelen, *Comando Supremo, Prot. N. 15112*, 22 Jul 43, IT 3029, folder IV, an. 4bis. There is another copy in *Operazioni in Sicilia dal 20 al 31 luglio 1943, Narrativa, Allegati*, It 99b, an. 67 (hereafter referred to as IT 99b). See also *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 23 Jul 43.

21. Ltr, Lt. Col. Jandl (on behalf of Rintelen), Ia No. 0641/43, Rome, 22 Jul 43, *Comando Supremo, Protezione vie comunicazione del Brennero, 1943*, IT 102.

22. Min, *Colloquio a Palazzo Vidoni, Roma, 24 luglio 1943*, IT 3037.

23. Paolo Puntoni. *Parla Vittorio Emanuele III* (Milan: Aldo Palazzi editore, 1958), pp. 136-37 (entry for 5 Jul 43).

24. Bonomi, *Diario*, pp. 19-21.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-24; Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, pp. 63, 70-71; Puntoni, *Vittorio Emanuele III*, p. 139.

26. Bonomi, *Diario*, pp. 26-28.

27. Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, pp. 62-63, 71, 76; Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 51-52; MS #P-058, Project 461, Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 6. Castellano (*Come firmai*, page 49) states that at this time the German reaction appeared less of a danger than that of the Fascists.

28. Puntoni, *Vittorio Emanuele III*, pp. 140-41. See also Castellano, *Come firmai*, p. 57; Vitetti, Notes on the Fall of the Fascist Regime, p. 10; Bonomi, *Diario*, p. 25.

29. Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 57-60.

30. Roatta, *Otto milioni*, pp. 262-63; Rossi, *Come arrivammo*, p. 204. For unfavorable comments on Carboni as a general officer, see *Generale Comandante di Corpo d'Armata Carboni, Giacomo*, IT 972; for his early friendship with Ciano and Castellano, see Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 22ff.

31. See the penetrating comments in Telg, Col. Helfferich, Rome, *Chef. Amt Ausland Abwehr*, 22 or 23 Jul 43, *OKW/Amtsgruppe Ausland, 19.IV.-1.XI.43* (OKW/1000.2).

32. For Badoglio's constitutional position, see Howard McGaw Smyth, "Italy: From Fascism to the Republic," *The Western Political Quarterly*, vol. I, No. 3 (September 1948), pp. 205-22.

33. Vitetti, Notes on the Fall of the Fascist Regime, pp. 8-9; Mussolini, *Storia di un anno*, p. 14; Ltr, Dino Grandi, 23 Jun 44, Incl 3 to Dispatch 835, 9 Aug 44, from the American Embassy, Lisbon, U.S. Dept of State Files; George Kent, "The Last Days of Dictator Benito Mussolini," *Reader's Digest* (October 1944), p. 13.

- [34.](#) "Count Dino Grandi Explains," *Life*, vol. 18, No. 9 (February 26, 1945), pp. 81-82; Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, pp. 73-74, 82.
- [35.](#) Mussolini, *Storia di un anno*, pp. 16-18; Bonomi, *Diario*, pp. 30-32.
- [36.](#) Mussolini, *Storia di un anno*, pp. 19-20; Monelli, *Roma 1943*, pp. 188-94; Puntoni, *Vittorio Emanuele III*, pp. 143-45.
- [37.](#) Ltr, Dino Grandi, 20 Feb 44, Incl 2 to Dispatch 835, 9 Aug 44, from the American Embassy, Lisbon, U.S. Dept of State Files.
- [38.](#) Monelli, *Roma 1943*, pp. 156-57; Bonomi, *Diario*, p. 36.
- [39.](#) Min, Special CCS Mtg, 26 Jul 43; Telg, CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 175, 26 Jul 43, CCS Cable Log.
- [40.](#) Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 300, 27 Jul 43, Salmon Files, 5-B-1; Directive, DCofS AFHQ to CG Fifth Army, sub: Opns on the Italian Mainland, 27 Jul 43, Personal Papers of Col Robert J. Wood, file Outline Plan, Operation AVALANCHE; Min of Exec Planning Mtg 5, 27 Jul 43, job 61C, reel 183C.
- [41.](#) AFHQ G-2 Weekly Intel Sum 48, 27 Jul 43, job 9, reel 23A.
- [42.](#) Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 266, 26 Jul 43, OPD TS Cable, IN, 1 Jul-31 Jul 43. Cf. Butcher, *My Three Years With Eisenhower*, p. 371.
- [43.](#) Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 302, 27 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 14 (a bound file of copies of telegrams and other documents relating to the Italian surrender, assembled for Maj. Gen. Walter B. Smith, Chief of Staff, AFHQ).
- [44.](#) *Ibid.*
- [45.](#) Butcher, *My Three Years With Eisenhower*, p. 372 (entry for 27 Jul 43).
- [46.](#) Telg 324, President to Prime Minister, 25 Jul 43, OPD 300.6 Security (OCS Papers); Winston S. Churchill, "The Second World War," vol. V, *Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 55.
- [47.](#) Telg 383, Prime Minister to President, 26 Jul 43, ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), Sec 1-A; a copy of this telegram, No. 4116, which was forwarded by General Devers (in England) to Eisenhower was received at AFHQ at 0850, 27 July 1943, Capitulation of Italy, p. 9; Churchill (*Closing the Ring*, pages 56-58) prints the whole message.
- [48.](#) Telg 4894, Eisenhower to Devers for Prime Minister, 27 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 17.
- [49.](#) *Onwards to Victory: War Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill*, compiled by Charles Eade (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1944), pp. 186-87.

- [50.](#) Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 60-61.
- [51.](#) *United States and Italy 1936-1946: Documentary Record*, U.S. Department of State Publication 2669, European Series 17 (Washington, 1946), p. 45.
- [52.](#) Telg 3600, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 30.
- [53.](#) Telg W-6024, Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 48-49.
- [54.](#) Telg 5499, Eisenhower to Devers for Prime Minister, 29 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 46-47.
- [55.](#) Copy of Msg from Br Foreign Office to U.S. State Dept, 27 Jul 43, OPD Files, Prime-President, Exec 10, item 63.
- [56.](#) Min, 3d Mtg CCAC, 29 Jul 43, ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), Sec 1-A, item 6.
- [57.](#) Telg 4995, Foreign Minister Eden to Viscount Halifax (repeated to British Resident Minister, Algiers), 29 Jul 43; Telg 387, Churchill to Roosevelt, 29 Jul 43, both in OPD Misc Exec 2, item 5; Telg 4157, Churchill to Eisenhower, 29 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 43-44; Cf. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 60-61.
- [58.](#) The President stipulated one slight change dealing with the withdrawal of the German forces on the Italian mainland. Telg 330, Roosevelt to Churchill, 29 Jul 43, ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), Sec 1-A.
- [59.](#) Telg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 30 Jul 43, OPD Misc Exec 2, item 5.
- [60.](#) Harold Calendar in the *New York Times*, July 31, 1943, p. 1. Cf. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 64.
- [61.](#) The revision and clearance with the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the broadcast to Italy can be traced in: Telg 327, Roosevelt to Churchill, 27 Jul 43, and Telg 384, Churchill to Roosevelt, 28 Jul 43, as repeated in Telg 4135, Churchill to Eisenhower, 28 Jul 43; Telg 3611, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Jul 43; Telg 4399, Eisenhower to Churchill, 29 Jul 43, all in Capitulation of Italy, pp. 20-21, 31, 46. The Italian text as received in Italy is printed in: *Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Il contributo italiano nella guerra contro la Germania* (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico Dello Stato, 1946), p. 1. See also Telg 324 Roosevelt to Churchill, 25 Jul 43, and Telg Roosevelt to Eisenhower, 28 Jul 43, both in OPT 300.6 Security (OCS Papers).
- [62.](#) Associated Press dispatch from Berne, Switzerland, July 30, 1943, *New York Times*, July 30 1943, p. 3; Rossi, *Come arrivammo*, p. 72.
- [63.](#) Telg 3600, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 30; Telg, Churchill to Roosevelt, No. 389, 30 Jul 43, ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), Sec. 1-A, repeated to Eisenhower through Devers, Msg 4180, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 51-52 (copy also found in OPD 300.6 Security (OCS Papers)).

[64.](#) Telg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 31 Jul 43, ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), sec. 1-A, (copy to Eisenhower in Telg 3824, Marshall to Eisenhower, 31 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 59-60); Telg, Churchill to Roosevelt, as given in Telg 4222, Devers to Eisenhower, 31 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 66-67.

[65.](#) Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 64-65.

[66.](#) Memorandum for General Marshall, Admiral King, and General Arnold, 2 Aug 43, sub: Surrender Terms, OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 25 (copy in OPD 300.6 Security (OCS Papers)).

[67.](#) JCS Memo for President, 3 Aug 43, sub: Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), sec. 1-A.

[68.](#) Memo for rcd, Surrender Terms for Italy, n.d., Document A, n.d., ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), sec. 1-A. Document A is the revised version of CCS 258 with Article 30 filled out, and with the formula for unconditional surrender incorporated in the preamble. The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the Strategy and Policy Group of OPD made the suggestions for the rewording.

[69.](#) Min, 4th Mtg CCAC, 5 Aug 43, ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), sec. 1-A.

[70.](#) Min, 105th Mtg CCS, 6 Aug 43, Supplementary, item 9; Telg 4363, Marshall to Eisenhower.

[71.](#) Telg W-6503, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Aug 43, and Telg 4115, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Aug 43, both in Smith Papers, box 4. See also Butcher, *My Three Years With Eisenhower*, pp. 382-83.

[72.](#) Butcher, *My Three Years With Eisenhower*, p. 375; Telgs W-6406 and W-6509, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 and 4 Aug 43, and British Resident Minister in Algiers to Churchill, 4 Aug 43, Smith Papers, box 4; *New York Times*, August 3, 1943, p. 1.

[73.](#) Coles, USAAF Hist Study 37, pp. 163-64; Telgs W-6406 and W-6509, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 and 4 Aug 43, and Telg W-6516/7711, AFHQ to AGWAR, 4 Aug 43, all in OPD Exec 2, item 6; see also, Butcher, *My Three Years With Eisenhower*, pp. 378-79.

[74.](#) Ltr 492/42, Archbishop Cicognani to Sumner Welles, 2 Aug 43, OPD Exec 2, item 6; Memo, Col Hammond for President, White 22, 2 Aug 43, OPD Exec 2, item 5; Memo, Sumner Welles for Marshall, 2 Aug 43, inclosing request from Apostolic Delegate; Memo, Marshall for Handy, 2 Aug 43, sub: Rome an Open City; Telg, Marshall to Eisenhower, FAN 181, 2 Aug 43; Memo, Col Hammond for President, White 25, 2 Aug 43; Memo, Col Hammond for Marshall, 3 Aug 43, all found in OPD 300.6 Security (OCS Papers).

[75.](#) Msg 403, Churchill to Roosevelt, 4 Aug 43, OPD Exec 2, item 6; Telg 401, Churchill to Roosevelt, 3 Aug 43, and Telg 402, Churchill to Roosevelt, 4 Aug 43, OPD 300.6 Security (OCS Papers). There were some reports of this plan in the press. See Associated Press dispatch of July 31, 1943, Berne, Switzerland, in *New York Times*, August 1, 1943, and article by Edwin L. James, p. E-3.

[76](#). Memo, JCS for President, 5 Aug 43, and for General Hull, 19 Aug 43, both in OPD Exec 2, item 6; Telgs, Eisenhower to Marshall and Marshall to Eisenhower, Smith Papers, box 4.

[77](#). CCS 306, 14 Aug 43, Rome an Open City; Min, 108th Meeting CCS, 15 Aug 43, item 2; Telg, CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 191, 14 Aug 43, and Telg, CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 194, 15 Aug 43, OPD Exec 2, item 6; Telg 5309 Marshall to Eisenhower, 14 Aug 43, and Telg 1682, AFHQ to KKAD, Quebec, 15 Aug 43, both in Smith Papers, box 4.

Chapter XV

Dissolution of the Rome-Berlin Axis

Badoglio's First Moves

About 1700, 25 July, the Italian monarch summoned Marshal Badoglio, informed him of his appointment as Head of Government, and handed him the list of his cabinet members--civil servants without party connection or support--that the sovereign and the Duke of Acquarone had selected. As Head of Government, Badoglio was to be responsible for civil functions only. Victor Emmanuel III resumed the supreme command of the Italian armed forces, a power that Mussolini had exercised since 11 June 1940. Ambrosio was to continue as chief of *Comando Supremo*, Roatta as chief of the Army General Staff, *Superesercito*.

Badoglio accepted the situation and the conditions, including two proclamations already drafted, which the marshal issued over his own signature and communicated through the press and radio. The first announced Badoglio's appointment and assured Italy and the world that "The war continues." The second proclamation warned the Italian people, the Fascist organization, and other political parties against agitating the government with precipitate demands for wholesale political changes or for peace.¹ The first was a clear, official announcement of the continued vitality of the treaty of alliance with Germany.²

Though the Badoglio government dissolved the Fascist party and began to incorporate the Fascist militia gradually into the Regular Army, the government was non-Fascist rather than anti-Fascist. The change of regime seemed to mark the first step toward a restoration of constitutional government, but the actual basis of Badoglio's powers was in the Fascist constitutional laws. The King had been careful to maintain his role as a constitutional monarch, accepting Mussolini's resignation and appointing Badoglio his successor as *Capo del Governo*, with all the powers of that office created by the Fascist laws of 1925 and 1926. But Badoglio refused to take any action without the explicit authorization of the King. In actuality, Italy reverted to absolute monarchy. At Badoglio's insistence, whatever civil power he exercised was to be construed as a direct emanation of the King's will. Whatever military commands and directives Ambrosio issued were in accordance with the King's direct wishes.

Relieved of the Fascist burden, the country seethed with political excitement and with the expectation of immediate peace. To check the unrest, Roatta transferred control of four divisions from himself to the Minister of War, Generale di Brigata in Riserva Antonio Sorice, who moved two from the interior of Italy to Turin and two from France to Milan. Eventually, Sorice controlled five divisions, all to be used for maintaining public order and therefore not available for defense against attack by either the Allies or the Germans.³

While awaiting the return to Italy of Raffaele Guariglia, Ambassador to Turkey, who was to become Minister of Foreign Affairs, Badoglio took charge of foreign policy. In accordance with the King's wishes, the immediate aim was to avoid conflict with the Germans. Badoglio wished to end the war, jointly with the Germans if possible. At the least, he was to try to secure German consent to a dissolution of the Pact of Steel.⁴

At the *carabinieri* barracks where he spent his first night in captivity after his forced resignation, Mussolini received a note from Badoglio. The measures taken toward him, Badoglio explained, were in the interest of his personal safety, for a plot had been discovered against his life. Mussolini replied, thanking Badoglio for his consideration. He would make no difficulties, he added, but would, rather, cooperate to the fullest extent. Expressing satisfaction over the decision to continue the war, he wished Badoglio well in his task of serving the King, "whose loyal servant I remain."⁵

Immediately after the Feltre conference, Hitler and the OKW had felt reassured over the situation in Italy. The Italian High Command had promised to commit four additional Italian divisions in the south: one in Sicily, two in Puglia, and one in Calabria. On 22 July, Hitler had released the *29th Panzer Grenadier Division* for employment on Sicily. That same day, Ambrosio had accepted the conditions laid down by Keitel at Feltre and had formally requested two additional German divisions. Field Marshal Rommel, who had been designated to command *Army Group B* in the *ALARICH* plan, was on 21 July removed from this assignment and sent to Salonika to take command of German troops in Greece. The warning orders for operations *ALARICH* and *KONSTANTIN* were suspended.⁶ On 23 July, Hitler issued orders in accordance with Ambrosio's request alerting the *305th* and *76th Infantry Divisions* for movement from France to southern Italy. Hitler entertained no suspicion whatsoever that his friend Mussolini might secretly be searching for contact with the Western Powers. General von Rintelen did report, however, that *Comando Supremo* had little confidence that Sicily could be held and, on 24 July, he indicated that tension in Italy had increased rather than diminished as a result of the Feltre conference.⁷

News of the political change in Italy came as a surprise to the Germans. The first reports to reach Berlin on 25 July were not alarming. They indicated merely that the Fascist old guard had brought about the convocation of the Grand Council to urge the Duce to take more energetic measures against defeatism. Not until the next day did the Germans learn that Ciano and Grandi had led a revolt, that Mussolini had resigned, and that the King had appointed Badoglio in his place.⁸

Hitler could not believe that Mussolini had resigned voluntarily. He was sure that force had been used, and he felt that the convocation of the Grand Council had been a show carefully prepared by the King and Badoglio. He feared that these two, who in his opinion had been sabotaging the war all along, might already have done away with his friend.

Hitler's first impulse was to strike with lightning speed--seize Rome with the *3d Panzer Grenadier Division* (located near Lake Bolsena 35 miles north of the city), and the *2d Parachute Division* (to be air-transported from France to the Rome area); kidnap the King, the Heir Apparent, Badoglio, and the cabinet ministers; and discover and liberate Mussolini as the only means of rejuvenating the Fascist party. So extreme was Hitler's anger and apprehension that he thought even of seizing the Vatican and the Pope. Goebbels and Ribbentrop, after lengthy argument, persuaded Hitler to drop this extreme measure.⁹

The main issue was whether to act at once in Italy with the forces available or to make more careful preparations that involved delay. Hitler favored immediate action, even if improvised, in order to capture the Badoglio government before it could consolidate its power. A quick, bold stroke, he believed, would restore the prestige of Fascism.

Rommel and others advocated caution. They feared that German moves would invite the Allies to establish themselves on the Italian mainland and that a blow against the King would turn the Italian officer corps against the Germans. Since Rommel concurred in the general belief that Mussolini's overthrow had been carefully prepared, and since he believed that the new government had already approached the Allies with an offer of peace, Rommel thought it best to retire from Sicily, Sardinia, and southern Italy, but to hold northern Italy. He recommended that Kesselring withdraw his forces and consolidate with Rommel's forces in the north, where all would come under Rommel's command.¹⁰

The first German orders prompted by Mussolini's overthrow were issued on the night of 26 July. The general framework and outline of Plan *ALARICH* were at hand but the German reaction to the new situation in Italy had a large measure of improvisation. Field Marshal von Rundstedt, *OB WEST*, was ordered to move two divisions toward the Italian border: the *305th Infantry Division* toward Nice, and the *44th Infantry Division* toward the Brenner Pass. He was to carry out two operations which had formed integral parts of the *ALARICH* plan: *KOPENHAGEN*, the seizure of the Mount Cenis pass; and *SIEGFRIED*, the occupation of the southern coast of France in the area of the Italian *Fourth Army*. Field Marshal Rommel was recalled from Salonika to command *Army Group B*, with headquarters in Munich. Meanwhile, Ambassador von Mackensen, Field Marshal Kesselring, and General von Rintelen were instructed to learn all they could regarding the intentions of the new government.¹¹

Plans against Italy began to develop at once in three main stages. First, *Army Group B* was to occupy north Italy. Behind the two initial divisions dispatched toward Italy, Rundstedt was to move up four more divisions from France. The *II SS Panzer Corps*, comprising two SS panzer divisions, was to be withdrawn from the Eastern Front to become part of Rommel's new command. Second, Generaloberst Kurt Student was to fly to Rome, take operational control of the *3d Panzer Grenadier* and *2d Parachute Divisions*, seize the capital and the leading political personalities, and liberate Mussolini. Capt. Otto Skorzeny, personally selected by Hitler, was to have the special mission of locating and liberating the Duce. Because earlier *ALARICH* planning had designated Student to occupy the Alpine passes with his *XI Flieger Korps* (*1st* and *2d Parachute Divisions*), OKW assigned this task to General der Gebirgstruppen Valentin Feurstein, who was to use troops stationed at the Mountain Training School in Mittenwald, fifteen miles north of Innsbruck. Third, as soon as all was in readiness for the stroke planned against the Italian Government, Rommel was to take command of all German forces in north Italy. Kesselring was then to withdraw the German troops from the Italian islands and from south Italy and consolidate his forces with Rommel's command in the north. At that time, Kesselring's command in Italy would come to an end.

In connection with the third step, Hitler's headquarters dispatched a naval officer to Frascati to explain Kesselring's role in the plan. Kesselring was to halt all movements of additional troops to Sicily; prepare to evacuate all air units from Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, destroying, if necessary, their heavy equipment; concentrate in assembly areas the *16th* and *26th Panzer Divisions* and that part of the *29th Panzer Grenadier Division* still on the Italian mainland, suspending thereby further movements to the south; alert the *3d Panzer Grenadier* and *2d Parachute Divisions* (the latter upon its arrival near Rome) to their mission; be ready to take over all the anti-aircraft defenses in Italy, repossessing the flak

material furnished Italian units; and send transport aircraft to France to carry the *2d Parachute Division* to Italy.¹²

Kesselring took a different view of the situation from that of OKW. Optimistic by temperament and inclined to trust those with whom he worked, he had called on Badoglio on 26 July, accompanied by the German Ambassador, Mackensen. Badoglio assured the Germans that he had known nothing of the movement against Mussolini until he was summoned by the King to take office. He had insisted, Badoglio continued, on maintaining the alliance with Germany as a condition of taking office, and his proclamation made clear that the war would continue. When the Germans expressed some curiosity as to Mussolini's fate, Badoglio showed Mussolini's letter as proof not only of his personal safety but also of his intention to do nothing to oppose the new regime. When Kesselring turned the conversation to military matters and said it was necessary to overcome the sense of fatigue among Italian troops and to eliminate certain impediments to the military effort raised by the civil administration, Badoglio declared he would do everything he could to improve the co-operation of Italian civil officials. Problems of morale, however, concerned the military, and Badoglio urged Kesselring to take up the problem directly with Ambrosio, chief of *Comando Supremo*.

Kesselring and Rintelen called on Ambrosio, who assured them that the political change had no effect on military operations. Like Badoglio, Ambrosio emphasized Italy's determination to continue in the war on the side of her ally. As to improving Italian troop morale, Ambrosio observed that this was not an easy matter, it would take time. Kesselring reminded Ambrosio that Hitler at Feltre had promised to send all the reinforcements Germany could spare, and he urged measures to restore the sense of comradeship between Italian and German troops.¹³

Badoglio's and Ambrosio's declarations conformed with the King's basic policy--to avoid a unilateral breach of the alliance by Italy, and to take no action that would bring Italians into conflict with Germans. These assurances were not altogether dishonest. Kesselring, on his side, appreciated the Italian participation in the war. He respected Ambrosio and Roatta. Accepting the Italian statements in good faith, he bent his efforts toward maintaining the alliance.¹⁴

Though Goebbels cynically wrote that "Kesselring fell for a well-staged show," Kesselring felt that more was to be gained by exploiting the current willingness of the Italian Government to co-operate than by precipitating a crisis that might lead to collapse and chaos. After receiving the instructions brought personally by the naval officer, Kesselring reported to OKW his belief that the Fascist party had lost out because of its own weakness and lack of leadership and that no support could be expected from it. He thought that the measures planned by Student and Skorzeny could be executed, but not without care and consequent delay. Action against the Italian forces guarding Rome would completely alienate, he felt, all who still bore some good will toward Germany. Furthermore, an armed struggle in the Rome area would disrupt all traffic to the south, halt the movement of supplies and reinforcements, and expose the German forces in Sicily and southern Italy to the danger of being cut off. In the interest of these troops at least, he urged, the Germans should exploit the willingness of the Italian Government to receive additional German units. In contrast with Rommel's estimate, Kesselring believed that he could, if reinforced, defend all of Italy and the Balkans, and he recommended this course of action to Hitler.¹⁵

Kesselring's representations had an effect. On 28 July, OKW suspended Student's mission, ordering him instead merely to be ready to seize the Italian Government and liberate Mussolini.¹⁶ Student and Skorzeny were by then at Frascati, and the first lift of the *2d Parachute Division* arrived that day at Pratica di Mare, an airfield not far from Frascati. Roatta was curious about the sudden arrival of German paratroopers, but he accepted with seeming good grace Kesselring's explanation--they were reinforcements for the *1st Parachute Division* in Sicily. While the Germans thus set the stage for Hitler's coup--kidnapping the Italian Government--Skorzeny threw himself wholeheartedly into the mission of finding Mussolini. Dazzled by the honor of having been summoned to Hitler's headquarters, Skorzeny had fallen under Hitler's spell. Mussolini, the Fuehrer had said, was the last of the Romans and his only true friend. He would go to any length to save him from being turned over to the Allies. Skorzeny vowed to be worthy of Hitler's trust.¹⁷

Meanwhile, on 27 July, Badoglio formulated his plan for a joint peace effort and presented it to the King, who authorized it as official policy. Badoglio then sent a telegram to Hitler proposing a meeting on Italian soil between the King and the Fuehrer. His purpose was to explain candidly the need for a joint peace before the Axis bargaining power was diluted by divergent diplomatic courses.¹⁸

Because Alfieri, the Italian Ambassador at Berlin, had come to Rome to attend the meeting of the Grand Council, where he had voted against Mussolini, and had not returned to his post, the Italian Military Attaché at Berlin, Generale di Corpo d'Armata Efisio Marras, received instructions to fly to the Fuehrer's headquarters to reinforce the request for a conference. Without knowledge of Badoglio's intentions, Marras did not know whether Badoglio was trying to secure a joint Italo-German peace move, though the idea was not excluded. According to his instructions, Marras was to establish contact with Hitler on behalf of the new Italian Government, read a copy of Mussolini's letter indicating his continuing loyalty to the King, propose a meeting of the heads of state, and indicate the Italian desire to withdraw the Italian *Fourth Army* from southern France to Italy.¹⁹

The same day that Marras was getting ready to visit Hitler, 29 July, Kesselring was in conference with the Fuehrer. There Kesselring reinforced his argument in favor of maintaining correct relations with the Badoglio government--at least until the Germans could introduce additional German divisions into Italy peaceably.

On the surface at least, Hitler accepted Kesselring's program. He instructed Kesselring to direct all his dealings with *Comando Supremo* toward securing the movement of the maximum number of German troops into northern Italy. Actually, however, Hitler was using Kesselring, Rintelen, and Mackensen--the "Italophiles" as they were called in OKW--to allay Italian suspicions and to keep Badoglio in the alliance while OKW made ready to take drastic action.²⁰

Though all reports from Kesselring and Mackensen, and from Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, intelligence chief, as well, gave credence to the solemn declarations of loyalty to the Axis by the King, Badoglio, Ambrosio, and Roatta, the reports made little impression on Hitler. He was certain that the Italian Government was planning "treason." A transatlantic conversation between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill intercepted by Germany on 29 July confirmed Hitler's suspicions that negotiations between Italy and the Allies were under

way, even though the conversation indicated no more than an expectation of receiving Italian overtures.²¹

Hitler received Marras at his headquarters on the morning of 30 July. Marras felt that Hitler suspected him of being Badoglio's "torpedo" with the job of rubbing out the Fuehrer. For while Marras delivered Badoglio's message, he was conscious that Jodl, Generalmajor Rudolf Schmundt, and Ambassador Walter Hewel were facing him from three different points in the room, each with his hand on a revolver in his pocket. Marras remained rigid, not even venturing to make a move for his handkerchief. Hitler, who appeared calm, criticized the sudden Italian political change in the midst of war, and asked why a military attaché should be drawn into a political matter. Accepting Badoglio's declaration that the war would continue, Hitler saw no immediate need for a conference with the King or Badoglio, particularly because of the recent meeting with Mussolini at Feltre. Hitler suggested rather that the ministers of foreign affairs and the chiefs of staff might examine the situation from the standpoint of continuing the war. He made no direct reply to the proposed withdrawal of the Italian Army from southern France. He admitted that it might be useful at a later date for him to confer with the King and Badoglio, in which case the Heir Apparent--Prince Humbert--ought also to be present.²²

Marras submitted his report to Badoglio on 1 August, and on the same day a telegram arrived from Hitler proposing a conference of foreign ministers and chiefs of staff at Tarvis, just across the border from Italy, on the 5th or 6th of August. Badoglio accepted Hitler's proposal.²³

Hitler refused to confer on Italian soil or to leave Germany because he feared an attempt on his life. He proposed, instead, the meeting of second echelon officials in order to avoid a discussion of what Badoglio and others considered the fundamental issue: whether or not to make peace with the Allies. Badoglio, hoping for a frank talk with Hitler in the near future, declined to initiate any approach to the Western Allies until the Germans had clearly revealed their intentions.

By then, 1 August, OKW had a completely formulated plan, code-named *ACHSE*, to meet the possibility of an Italian double cross. Like *ALARICH*, drawn up in the latter part of May in anticipation of political change in Italy, *ACHSE* was based on the premise of Italian defection. Upon receipt of the code word, German units in Italy were to take over the country by force.²⁴

Events occurring on the Italian frontier during the last days of July seemed to indicate that the *ACHSE* button might be pushed at any moment.

Friction Along the Alps

In accordance with OKW instructions issued during the night of 26 July, Rundstedt started to move the *305th Infantry Division* from the interior of France toward Nice and the *44th Infantry Division* toward the Brenner Pass. At the border, transportation was to be arranged with Italian authorities on the assumption that the divisions were destined for southern Italy in accordance with agreements concluded with *Comando Supremo*. When on 27 July the

leading elements of the *305th Infantry Division* reached Nice, which was in the area controlled by the Italian *Fourth Army*, they learned that *Comando Supremo* objected to further movement into Italy because of a shortage of railway transportation. *Comando Supremo* refused to provide transportation on the following day, and on 29 July the Italians informed OKW that the *305th Infantry Division* would have to wait at least several days before transportation could be made available to move it to southern Italy.²⁵

Comando Supremo at least had a good excuse and perhaps a legitimate reason. Roatta, who as chief of *Superesercito* had operational control over all the ground forces, German and Italian, in Italy (except those Italian troops moved to the large cities to restrain civil disturbances), conferred with Kesselring on 28 July and reaffirmed that he wanted two more German divisions in the defense of southern Italy. But he explained that railway traffic was particularly congested because of the dispatch of an Italian division northward to check civilian unrest in Milan, Turin, and Bologna. German movements had to be halted temporarily, Roatta said, otherwise situations might occur wherein German troops would find Italian forces unexpectedly blocking their way. Roatta hoped to overcome the traffic problem by prohibiting all civilian travel, and proposed that half the train space be allocated for Italian movements, half for German. Kesselring seemed placated.²⁶

On 29 July, Mussolini's birthday, while a rumor swept Rome that the Germans were preparing to seize the Italian capital, while Ambassador von Mackensen brought greetings to Mussolini with inquiries as to his whereabouts, and while Kesselring carried a handsome set of the works of Nietzsche as a present from Hitler to Mussolini and asked to deliver it personally, the Italian Ministry of War received three alarming telegrams from Generale di Corpo d'Armata Alessandro Gloria, commander of the *XXXV Corps* at Bolzano, forty miles south of the Brenner Pass. Gloria reported German troops assembling in the German Tyrol and at least one group moving on foot toward the Brenner Pass.²⁷

While the Italians politely frustrated Mackensen's and Kesselring's attempts to discover Mussolini's whereabouts, *Comando Supremo* prepared to resist the Germans on two fronts--to ward off a surprise attack against Rome and to oppose the incursion of unwanted German reinforcements into Italian territory. Summoning Roatta, Ambrosio informed him that providing for the defense of Rome against a possible German *coup d'état* had priority over protecting the coast against the threat of Allied landings. He also told Roatta to oppose the movement of German units across the frontier, except those specifically requested or permitted by *Comando Supremo*.

For the first mission, Roatta constituted a command called the *Army Corps of Rome* (the *12th (Sassari) Infantry Division*, elements of the *21st (Granatieri) Infantry Division*, police forces, African police troops, and depot units) under Generale di Corpo d'Armata Alberto Barbieri to provide for the internal security of the city and to reinforce General Carboni, who a week earlier had been placed in command of the *Motorized Corps* (the *Piave Division*, the *Ariete Armored Division*, the remainder of the *Granatieri Division*, and the *131st (Centauro) Division*) in the outer defenses of the city. To augment the defenses of Rome still further, Roatta had the *XVII Corps* move the *103d (Piacenza) Motorized Division* to positions just south of the capital, leaving only two coastal divisions to guard the nearby shore area.²⁸

For the second mission, Roatta on 30 July sent officer couriers to the *Fourth Army* in southern France, to the *Second Army* in Slovenia-Croatia-Dalmatia, and to the *XXXV Corps* in Bolzano, warning them to be ready to oppose by force unauthorized German incursions and directing them to place demolition charges along the railway lines to impede frontier crossings.²⁹

The *26th Panzer Division*, whose entry into Italy had been authorized earlier by the *Comando Supremo*, was not affected by these orders. About half of that division was already in southern Italy in accordance with the joint plans of *Comando Supremo* and OKW for the defense of the Italian peninsula. The remaining parts of the division crossed the Brenner Pass without incident during the late afternoon and early evening of 30 July. These troops reported evidence of demolition charges planted by Italian troops and the impression that the Italian forces in the frontier area had been reinforced.³⁰

Hitler was outraged by this seeming manifestation of Italian perfidy. He directed the divisions moving to Italy to carry out their orders even if bloodshed resulted. Specifically, he wanted an assault group of the *60th Panzer Grenadier Division* to move to the head of the *305th Infantry Division* column in the Nice area and to fight its way, if necessary, across the border into Italy. But since the movement of the assault group to Nice required two days, the Nice area remained quiet.³¹

The test came, instead, in the Brenner area. OKW instructed Kesselring to notify *Comando Supremo* that divisions authorized and scheduled to enter Italy--such as the *26th Panzer Division*--were still crossing the border; and that to avoid aggravating the railway congestion still further, the motorized elements of these divisions were planning to move by road. But Kesselring was not to tell Ambrosio that the *305th Infantry* and the *44th Infantry Divisions*, units not authorized to enter, had also been instructed to make a road march into Italy, an instruction passed along to these divisions the same day. Without awaiting the result of Kesselring's discussions with the Italians, OKW directed *OB WEST* to begin moving the other divisions assigned to the *Army Group B* from France toward Italy.³²

Shortly before midnight, 30 July, General Gloria, the *XXXV Corps* commander at Bolzano, received a message from General Feurstein who commanded the German Mittenwald Training School near Innsbruck. Feurstein said he was coming to Gloria's headquarters the following morning to co-ordinate the arrival of certain troops. In accordance with the OKW-*Comando Supremo* agreement, Feurstein stated, German elements were reinforcing Italian garrisons along the Brenner railway line. Before replying, Gloria telephoned Rome for instructions.³³

Ambrosio made the decision early the next day. He directed Roatta "to make certain that there enter into Italy only those elements authorized, that is, the remaining parts of the *26th Panzer Division* and 30 antiaircraft batteries, and their 100-200 trucks."³⁴

When the leading elements of the German *44th Infantry Division* reached the Brenner frontier on 31 July, Gloria refused to let them pass. Feurstein appeared at Gloria's headquarters at 1000 and the two commanders conferred about an hour. Feurstein made two points. The *44th Infantry Division*, he said, was to march from the Brenner Pass to Bolzano in three days on the basis of OKW-*Comando Supremo* agreements. Because the British were expected to bomb the Brenner railway line heavily in the near future, German

antiaircraft batteries were to reinforce the protection of the pass. After a formal and polite discussion, Feurstein returned to Innsbruck, and Gloria reported a summary of the conversation to his immediate superior command, the *Eighth Army*, and to the Ministry of War in Rome. The report arrived in Roatta's operations section before noon, and from there was transmitted to Ambrosio.³⁵

Ambrosio that afternoon addressed a sharp note to Rintelen. He pointed out that the *44th Infantry Division* was scheduled to move to southern Italy, not to guard the railway lines in the north. He made it plain that the congested railroads would make it impossible to move the *44th* and *305th Infantry Divisions* for at least ten days. He requested Rintelen to wait until rail transportation was clear before moving the German divisions into Italy.³⁶

Kesselring called on Badoglio later that afternoon to clarify the situation. When Badoglio explained that military questions were outside his competence, Kesselring went to Ambrosio. He urged that the common war aims of the Axis Powers ought to make it possible for the two German divisions to be permitted to continue their movements. Ambrosio refused, but after a lively exchange he agreed to meet again with Kesselring the next morning. Rintelen then requested OKW to suspend the movements of the two divisions pending the outcome of the Kesselring-Ambrosio conference.³⁷

Rintelen was deeply distressed by the growing Italo-German conflict. He knew beyond all doubt that Badoglio considered the war lost, and he found himself in sympathy with this point of view and with Badoglio's policy of seeking to end the war in conjunction with the Germans. Not only the Italians, Rintelen was well aware, but also certain high-ranking German officers and politicians recognized that the Axis had lost the war. Before the Feltre conference some of them had secretly voiced the hope that Mussolini would take the bull by the horns, that as Hitler's equal he would bring up the subject which they, Hitler's subordinates dared not suggest--a compromise peace as the only way to save Europe from communism. Now they wished, and Rintelen with them, that Badoglio would speak the words to Hitler that Mussolini had not ventured to utter.

Disturbed by Hitler's suspicions that Badoglio was already trying to make peace with the Allies, Rintelen urged Kesselring to resign his command rather than execute orders to occupy Italy. Plans *ALARICH* and *ACHSE* not only involved a flagrant breach of faith but also constituted a danger for the German troops in the country. How could the war continue? For certainly the execution of the plans to occupy Italy would throw the Italians into the Allied camp. Speaking by telephone with Keitel on 31 July, Rintelen requested an appointment to report personally to the Fuehrer his views on the Italian situation. Keitel agreed.³⁸

Next day, while Rintelen prepared to fly to East Prussia to see Hitler, a further crisis occurred in Italo-German relations. Momentarily expecting Hitler to give the code word *ACHSE*, OKW instructed Feurstein to continue to march the *44th Infantry Division* through the Brenner Pass into Italy.³⁹

In Rome, Kesselring met with Ambrosio at 0930. Following OKW instructions, Kesselring made an impassioned plea that the *44th Infantry Division* be allowed to proceed, a unit being sent, he emphasized, in accordance with Ambrosio's promise of 22 July to defend Sicily to the utmost and in accordance with Ambrosio's request of that same day for two

additional German divisions for duty in southern Italy. Ambrosio turned a deaf ear. He insisted that the German division would have to wait at the frontier until railway transportation became available.⁴⁰

Soon after the conference, Generale di Corpo d'Armata Giuseppe De Stefanis, Roatta's deputy, telephoned Gloria at Bolzano. Gloria was to advise Feurstein to consult with OKW on the result of the conference at Rome. Gloria was to oppose the movement of the *44th Infantry Division* into Italy, and he was to tell Feurstein that an outbreak of armed strife would be Feurstein's responsibility. Gloria telephoned this information to Feurstein.⁴¹

Feurstein called back at 1550. He said that he had received word from OKW at 1100. OKW indicated that an agreement had been reached in Rome to allow the entry of the *44th Infantry Division*. Twenty minutes later Feurstein called again. He reiterated the information that Rome had agreed to permit the German division to march. If Gloria opposed its movement, Feurstein said, the responsibility for initiating armed conflict would fall on the Italians.⁴²

Though the Italians were actually in the process of changing their minds, OKW's information was probably premature. The main factor modifying Ambrosio's blunt stand was Badoglio, who was in frequent contact throughout the day with the *Comando Supremo* chief. Badoglio insisted that Ambrosio avoid any action that would bring about an Italo-German battle. He needed time, Badoglio said, to carry out his basic policy: make the Germans realize Italy's plight and the need for a common effort to terminate the war.⁴³

Having learned of Rintelen's intention to see the Fuehrer, Badoglio asked Rintelen, as an old friend, to call on him before leaving Rome. Rintelen did so, at 1600, and Badoglio explained his position. Fascism, Badoglio said, had fallen of its own weight. As an old soldier he had obeyed the call of the King. Now he wanted to meet with Hitler, who had rebuffed him. "I have given my pledge to continue the war and I stand by my word as a soldier," Badoglio declared. "But for this I need the trust of my ally; it will go bad for both of us if we do not cooperate." Pointing out the serious military situation, the preponderance of Allied resources, particularly in the air, which the bombings of Hamburg and Rome had made quite clear, Badoglio said that the Germans and Italians had to "work together to bring the war to an honorable conclusion." Would Rintelen, Badoglio asked, communicate this to Hitler?⁴⁴

Rintelen readily accepted the mission entrusted to him by Badoglio. Immediately after this conversation, Rintelen went home and wrote down a summary of the discussion. He then consulted with Ernst von Weizsaecker, German Ambassador to the Holy See. Although both men could not completely exclude the possibility that Badoglio was acting merely to win time, they agreed that Badoglio's wish to restore mutual confidence was probably genuine.⁴⁵

By then, Badoglio had probably informed Ambrosio of his conversation with Rintelen, for at 1810, 1 August, Roatta's operations chief, Generale di Brigata Umberto Utili, telephoned new instructions to General Gloria. Gloria was to permit the head of the *44th Infantry Division* column to march to the nearest railway station and there await trains for further movement into Italy. Some train space would be provided on the following morning. But the division was not to march beyond Bolzano. The elements of the *26th Panzer Division*,

however, could proceed by road if they wished in order to rejoin the remainder of the division already in Italy. Less than three hours later, Gloria was conferring with Feurstein's representative and making arrangements for the continued movement of the *44th Infantry Division* into Italy by rail.⁴⁶

Thus it was that *Army Group B* made its initial penetration with Italian consent. It was seduction, not rape.⁴⁷

As quickly as Hitler was successful in this test case, and while Badoglio was still hoping that Rintelen's mission would bear fruit, Hitler directed Field Marshal Kesselring to announce that two Panzer divisions would follow along the Brenner line, and that another infantry division would follow the *305th Infantry Division* by way of Nice. To keep the passage clear for the other troops, the *44th Infantry Division* held the sector of the railway line from Brennero to Bolzano. By 2 August the infiltration of *Army Group B* into northern Italy was in full swing, and the first lifts of the *2d Parachute Division* had arrived near Rome, a movement substantially completed after four days. Kesselring's explanation to Roatta now was that the division was needed in that area because of the possibility of an Allied parachute attack.⁴⁸

A day later, 3 August, OKW transmitted through Kesselring a formal note to explain its haste in reinforcing the troops in Italy. The Germans had feared, OKW said, that the political change in Italy might encourage the Allies to use an estimated thirteen to fifteen available divisions in a landing on the Ligurian or north Adriatic coast. OKW therefore thought it prudent to provide for the security of all forces by moving divisions first into the north, then into the south. The *305th Infantry* and *76th Infantry*, under *LXXXVII Corps*, were to protect the Ligurian coast. The *94th Infantry*, moving through the Mount Cenis pass, as well as the *1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler*, the *2d SS Panzer Division "Das Reich,"* and the *65th Infantry* were also to enter north Italy. OKW added that it was considering sending one or two additional armored divisions to Italy to form a reserve. It planned to reinforce the Mediterranean French coast defenses with the *715th Infantry* and *60th Panzer Grenadier Division*, plus two unspecified infantry divisions. All the details of co-ordination, OKW proposed, were to be settled at the conference scheduled for 6 August at Tarvis.⁴⁹

Though the Germans had not mentioned the *94th Infantry* and *65th Infantry* before, the Italians accepted the note without demur. They bent their efforts toward effecting such a distribution of the German divisions as to make for the least threat to Rome and to the principal northern bases of the fleet--La Spezia and Pola--and for the most appropriate dispositions to resist an Allied invasion of southern Italy. The crisis having passed, Ambrosio and Roatta faced the Germans with seeming good grace. Italo-German discussions on 3 August were friendly. Ambrosio agreed to provide transportation in the Brenner area. Roatta urged that German reinforcements be sent to the south as quickly as possible. Roatta also complained that some German troops behaved as though they believed that the Italians sympathized with the Allies, an attitude he found insulting to Italian honor. "Italy," he declared, "is not thinking of changing course."⁵⁰

So far as Roatta knew, he had made an honest declaration. What he did not know was that attempts had already been initiated to make contact with the Allies.⁵¹

On the same day, Rintelen was personally delivering Badoglio's message to Hitler, with Keitel and Jodl in attendance. After listening to Rintelen explain Badoglio's position, Hitler exploded. "This is the biggest impudence in history. Does the man imagine that I will believe him?"

"I have the impression," Rintelen replied, "that he is honorably working for the establishment of trust."

Hitler brushed this aside, remarking that the Anglo-Americans had probably repulsed Badoglio's effort to make peace and that Badoglio was therefore again seeking German support. After a brief discussion of the conference scheduled in a few days at Tarvis, Hitler dismissed Rintelen without a reply for Badoglio.⁵²

Later that day Rintelen received some sympathy from General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler, an old friend in the headquarters and Chief of Staff of the German Army. Zeitzler knew that Hitler's alleged proof of Badoglio's negotiations with the Western Powers was not true. Rintelen also spoke with Keitel and Jodl and told them that fascism was dead, that Mussolini was a sick man, and that it was necessary to support the Badoglio government as a bulwark against communism. When Jodl mentioned this view to Hitler the next day, he was roundly cursed and abused. Rintelen, Hitler said, was a traitor.

Rintelen had already returned to Rome, where he went directly to Kesselring's headquarters at Frascati. Richthofen, the air commander, was somewhat surprised to see him; he had been doubtful that Hitler would allow Rintelen out of Germany.⁵³

Badoglio felt that his hand had again been refused. His initial steps to bring about a joint peace move or to secure German understanding of the Italian situation had ended in failure. Badoglio nevertheless continued to hope that he might yet obtain German consent to a dissolution of the alliance and thereby exclude any action that might bring on Italo-German conflict.⁵⁴

The Italians, however, continued to work with the Germans to maintain the defense of Sicily and to prepare to oppose an invasion of the Italian mainland. At the same time they watched closely for a hostile German act against Rome and sought to make contact with the Allies. They were increasingly worried by the stranglehold the Germans had on Italy. The locations of the new German divisions offered no protection to the south, where an Allied threat was real and acute. Rather, the Germans were in position to seize the Italian naval bases, to occupy the north, and to grab Rome.⁵⁵

The Italian Course is Changed

About the same time that the crisis of 29 July-1 August was being overcome by the decision of the Italian Government and High Command to accept unwanted German reinforcements, the assumption of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Raffaele Guariglia gave a new impulse and a new direction to Italian foreign policy.

Brought from his post as Ambassador to Turkey, Guariglia was uninformed on the true state of affairs in Italy and as a result had indulged in some daydreams and wishful thinking. He fancied that Mussolini, out of love for Italy, had recognized that he himself was the greatest obstacle in the way of an approach to the Allies, and had therefore made the sacrifice of removing himself from power in order to save Italy from total disaster. Perhaps, Guariglia thought, a secret understanding with both Germany and the Allies had preceded Mussolini's resignation. Assuming that the first step of the Badoglio government would naturally be an approach to the Allies, he interpreted Badoglio's proclamation of continuing the war merely as a method of gaining time. Before leaving Istanbul, Guariglia asked the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to convey to the Allied representatives in Turkey Guariglia's personal conviction that Italy had to change course as quickly as possible. Though he could make no commitment, he asked that the Allies have faith in Italy's intentions and understanding of her plight. As an indication of their faith and understanding, he felt, the Allies should cease bombing Italian cities.⁵⁶

After arriving in Rome late in the afternoon of 29 July, Guariglia took over his office, and then met with Badoglio. He agreed with Badoglio to limit knowledge of any negotiations for peace to the smallest circle of officials--the matter should not be discussed even in the Council of Ministers. But at this point he was rudely awakened from the dreams he had conjured up in Istanbul, for he found his position in the new Italian Government enormously prejudiced by certain stark facts: the war continued; there was no contact with the Allies. He learned also that his position had been prejudiced by Badoglio's proposals to Germany through General Marras, and Badoglio's acceptance of Hitler's counterproposal of a meeting of foreign ministers, scheduled for 6 August.

Scarcely had Guariglia taken his oath of office on 30 July when General Castellano presented himself and tendered a memorandum from Ambrosio, chief of *Comando Supremo*. Identifying Castellano as an intimate colleague who had played a certain role in the developments leading to Mussolini's dismissal, Ambrosio's note said that it was absolutely necessary for Italy to conclude an armistice with the Allies and that therefore immediate contact had to be made with the Western Powers.⁵⁷

Guariglia tried to do so that very evening. In the greatest secrecy he visited the Papal Secretary of State and asked him to request the British Minister to the Holy See, Sir D'Arcy Q. Osborne, to transmit a message to the British Government. Unfortunately, the British diplomatic code at the Holy See had been broken and was known to the Italians and the Germans. This ruled out that channel of communication. At about the same time, Franco Babuzzio Rizzo, a subordinate of Guariglia's, was meeting with Harold Tittmann, assistant to Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President to His Holiness, the Pope. Rizzo wanted to get a message to the American Government. But the American office within the Vatican walls had no safe and speedy communication channel either. Though the American office could forward dispatches through Switzerland or Portugal in safety, this was a slow process.⁵⁸

On the following day, 31 July, the crown council met at the Quirinal Palace. Guariglia vigorously advocated an immediate approach to the Allies for the purpose of concluding a separate armistice. He stated that he had already taken steps in that direction by speaking to the Turkish Foreign Minister and by approaching the Allied representatives to the Holy See. As he understood the situation, the decision to approach the Western Powers had

already been made by the King some days ago. The crown council formally decided to separate Italy from the alliance with Germany and to seek an armistice with the Allies.⁵⁹

Guariglia implemented this decision by securing approval from the King and Badoglio to send an emissary to Portugal. He chose the Marchese Blasco Lanza D'Ajeta, Counselor of the Italian Embassy at the Holy See, who through Ciano had been kept informed of the movement to overthrow Mussolini. D'Ajeta spoke English, and was the godson of the wife of Sumner Welles, the American Under Secretary of State. Furthermore, he was of intermediate rank and his transfer from the Holy See would excite no German suspicions. Accordingly, the Foreign Office nominated D'Ajeta Counselor of the Italian Legation at Lisbon. Guariglia had D'Ajeta take along a large suitcase full of Foreign Office documents to keep them from falling into German hands. The gossip of polite circles in Rome promptly had it that D'Ajeta's mission was to save the Countess Ciano's jewels.⁶⁰

D'Ajeta received his instructions on 1 and 2 August from Guariglia, Castellano taking part in the second session. Sir D'Arcy Osborne provided a letter introducing D'Ajeta to his cousin, Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, British Ambassador at Lisbon. D'Ajeta was to make a full and candid explanation of the situation of the Italian Government, and point out that it was threatened internally by the Communists and by German occupation. He was to explain that the government wished to break with Germany, but that to do this the government needed help for its armed forces. He was to make it clear that he had no power to negotiate, but he was to suggest the desirability of military and political agreement by the Allies and the Italians in order to enable Italy to break with the Germans or turn against them. As a demonstration of faith, he was to inform the Allies of the German order of battle in Italy. Castellano carefully drilled D'Ajeta on the name, strength, and location of each German unit in Italy and of those expected to enter the country, and D'Ajeta committed this information to memory.⁶¹

D'Ajeta flew to Lisbon on 3 August, and presented himself at once to Renato Prunas, the Italian Minister. He sent his note of introduction to Sir Ronald, and the British Ambassador requested and received from his own government authorization to receive the Italian emissary. The conference took place the following day.

A trained diplomat, D'Ajeta carefully carried out his instructions. After giving a candid and detailed exposition of the Italian situation, he urged the ambassador to inform the British and American Governments that Italy was most anxious to escape the German yoke and to withdraw from the conflict. He pleaded for understanding in London and Washington of Italy's tragic situation: Italy, he said, was on the eve of a German military occupation. Besides the German divisions already in Italy, two more had begun to arrive from France on 2 August, bound for Turin, and about 200,000 German troops assembled around Innsbruck were occupying the Brenner Pass installations. Because Rome was in danger of immediate German seizure--an armored SS division with the most modern Tiger tanks was moving toward the capital--the King and the government had plans to escape to the island of Maddalena, off the coast of Sardinia. Some 300,000 Italian workmen were virtual hostages in Germany. After three years of warfare, Italy was on the verge of economic exhaustion. Italy, D'Ajeta continued, wished to negotiate. Hungary and Rumania would probably follow suit.

D'Ajeta then gave the exact locations of the German divisions as of 2 August. He explained that Italian troops had been moved to protect Rome, thereby leaving the coast of central Italy practically undefended. To maintain its independence, the Italian Government was resolved to defend the capital against German attack, even though the only good division in the area was the reconstituted armored *Ariete Division*, which had only enough ammunition to furnish a total of eighty-eight shells for each of its guns.

Emphasizing his lack of authority to negotiate, D'Ajeta urged that his disclosure of the German order of battle be the starting point for synchronizing Italian help with the Allied political and military plans. He requested a cessation of propaganda attacks against the King and Badoglio, a halting of bombings against Italian cities. He asked that Britain and America not misinterpret the impending Italo-German conference at Tarvis.

Ambassador Campbell listened attentively, asked several questions. D'Ajeta warned that the German armed forces were numerous and powerful. Reports of serious cleavage between the Nazi party and the military command, he said, were to be discounted. Campbell explained that he had no instructions except to listen. His personal opinion was that the Allies had already determined their military plans and had clearly announced their political views in the unconditional surrender formula.⁶²

The Italian Government waited for an official reply to D'Ajeta's overture. None came.

Meanwhile, on the day that D'Ajeta had left Rome for Lisbon, Guariglia and Badoglio decided to send another emissary to make contact with the British Government. They directed Alberto Berio, former Counselor of the Embassy at Ankara, to fly immediately to Tangier, there to replace Badoglio's son as Consul General. Berio's real mission was to inform the British Consul that Italy was willing to negotiate.

On the morning of 3 August, the day that D'Ajeta reached Lisbon, Guariglia gave Berio his detailed instructions. Berio was to make known the fact that because the Italian Government was a prisoner of the Germans, it would be useless and damaging to the Allied cause to demand of Italy an immediate and public capitulation. The Allied armies should attack the Balkans in order to draw German troops away from Italy, thereby making it possible for the Italians to join the Allies in clearing the Italian peninsula of German forces. Finally, the Allied press campaign against the Badoglio government ought to continue in order to deceive the Germans.

When Badoglio briefed Berio later that day, he added the point that the Allies would find it to their interest to aid the Italian Government maintain itself against the internal threat of communism. In this connection, the Allies should cease bombing Italian cities. The Marshal's son, Mario, who was present, made an additional suggestion: the Allies should land in Italy as soon and as far north as possible.⁶³

In Tangier on 5 August, Berio at once made contact with Mr. Watkinson, temporarily in charge of the British Consulate. After carrying out his instructions, Berio wired Rome of his action and, like D'Ajeta in Lisbon, waited for an Allied reply.⁶⁴

Footnotes

1. Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, p. 71. Badoglio learned later that Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, Italian Premier during World War I, had assisted in drafting the proclamations.
2. *Il Processo Carboni-Roatta: L'Armistizio e la difesa di Roma nella sentenza del Tribunale Militare (Estratto della "Rivista Penale," Maggio-Giugno 1949)*, (Rome: Società Editrice Temi), p. 9 (cited hereafter as *Il Processo Carboni-Roatta*).
3. *Comando Supremo, I Reparto, Operazioni: Regio Esercito--Quadro di battaglia alla data del 1 Iuglio 1943; Quadro di battaglia alla data del 1 agosto 1943*, IT 10 a-h; Roatta, *Otto milioni*, pp. 263-64; Rossi, *Come arrivammo*, pp. 94, 174-75, 404; Zanussi, *Guerra e catastrofe*, II, 54.
4. MS #P-058, Project 46, 1 Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 11; Rossi, *Come arrivammo*, p. 199; Roatta, *Otto milioni*, p. 291; Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, pp. 84-85; Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, p. 224.
5. Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, p. 72; Mussolini, *Storia di un anno*, p. 20.
6. *OKW/WFSt. KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 25 Jul 43; Rommel, Private KTB, entry 22 Jul 43.
7. MS #C-093 (Warlimont), pp. 40-41.
8. *Goebbels Diaries*, p. 403, entry 25 Jul 43. Ambassador von Mackensen's early reports did not reveal the full extent of the crisis, and he was bitterly criticized by Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs. See MS #C-013 (Kesselring), p. 5.
9. *Goebbels Diaries*, pp. 407-09.
10. Min of Confs 14, 15, and 16, 25 and 26 Jul 43, in Min of Hitler Confs.
11. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.VII-31.VII.43*, 26 Jul 43; Rommel, Private KTB, entries for 25-28 Jul 43.
12. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 26 Jul 43.
13. Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, pp. 224-25; *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 26 Jul 43; Min, *Colloquio a Palazzo Vidoni, Roma, 26 luglio 1943*, IT 3037.
14. Westphal, *Heer in Fesseln*, p. 224; MS #T-2, K 1 (Kesselring), pp. 6-7; Eugenio Dollmann. *Roma Nazista* (Milan: Longanesi & Co., 1949), p. 138.
15. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 27 Jul 43; MS #C-013 (Kesselring), p. 13.
16. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 28 Jul 43.
17. Otto Skorzeny, *Geheimkommando Skorzeny* (Hamburg: Hansa Verlag Josef Toth, 1950), pp. 100-101. For additional material on Skorzeny see Extract From Revised Notes 1

on The German Intelligence Services, VFZ/34, copy 23, 6 Dec 44, Source M.I.-6, AFHQ reel 365F, and Hq U.S. Forces European Theater, Interrogation Center, Consolidated Intelligence Report (CIR) 4, 23 Jul 45, sub: The German Sabotage Service, unprocessed files, NARS.

18. Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, pp. 84-85.

19. Simoni, *Berlino, Ambasciata*, pp. 377-78; Interv, Smyth with Marras, 20 Dec 48.

20. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 29 Jul 43; MS #C-093 (Warlimont), p. 79; MS #C-013 (Kesselring), p. 12.

21. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 29 Jul 43 MS #C-093 (Warlimont), page 84, mistakenly gives credence to this alleged proof.

22. Simoni, *Berlino, Ambasciata*, pp. 379-86; Interv, Smyth with Marras, 20 Dec 48.

23. Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, p. 96; Simoni, *Berlino, Ambasciata*, p. 387.

24. English translation of two telegrams, *OKW/WFSt, Nrs. 661747 and 661747/43 g.k.chefs.*, both dated 1 Aug 43 and signed by Keitel, in ONI, *Fuehrer Directives, 1942-1945*, pp. 87-88; *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 1 Aug 43; MS #C-093 (Warlimont), pp. 87-90.

25. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 27, 28, and 29 Jul 43.

26. *Ibid.*, 28 Jul 43.

27. Rpt, Admiral Canaris, *Chef Ausland Abwehr, OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 31 Jul 43; Simoni, *Berlino, Ambasciata*, pp. 376-377, 386; Bonomi, *Diario*, pp. 46-48; Telgs, *Comandante XXXV Corpo d'Armata Nos. 414, 454, 472/OP.*, to *Ministero Guerra Gabinetto*, 29 Jul 43, IT 102.

28. *Comando Supremo, Operazioni, Regio Esercito: Quadro di battaglia alla data del 1 agosto 1943*, IT 10 a-h; Roatta, *Otto milioni*, pp. 274, 294, 297-99; Zanussi, *Guerra e catastrofe*, II, 58; Rossi, *Come arrivammo*, p. 204; MS #P-058 Project 46, 1 Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 7.

29. Zanussi, *Guerra e catastrofe*, II, 56; Rossi, *Come arrivammo*, pp. 204-05; Roatta, *Otto milioni*, pp. 274-75. *Comando Supremo* informed OKW that Italian forces had been ordered to react vigorously to whatever violation or threat. See *Comando Supremo, Appunto per il Ministero Affari Esteri*, 5 Aug. 43, IT 3030; Cf. Rommel, *Private KTB*, entry 29 Jul 43.

30. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 30 Jul 43.

31. *Ibid.*, 31 Jul 43.

32. *Ibid.*, 30 Jul 43; MS #C-093 (Warlimont), p. 85.

33. Ministero della Guerra-Gabinetto, *Notizie pervenute dal Comando d'Armata Bolzano nella notte dal 30 al 31 luglio 1943*, IT 102.

34. Telg 15403, *Comando Supremo to Superesercito*, 31 Jul 43, IT 102.

35. Telg, *Comando XXXV Corpo d'Armata, No. 577 Op. to Ministero della Guerra-Gabinetto*, 31 Jul 43, *Comando XXXV Corpo d'Armata*, IT 120.

36. Msg, *Comando Supremo, No. 15416/Op to Rintelen*, 31 Jul 43, IT 102.

37. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43*, 31 Jul 43.

38. Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, pp. 195, 224; Simoni, *Berlino, Ambasciata*, pp. 314-15, 326, 341; Raffaele Guariglia, *Ricordi 1922-1946* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1950), pp. 548-49.

39. MS #C-093 (Warlimont), pp. 87-88.

40. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VIII.43*, 1 Aug 43.

41. Tel Conv, 1400, 1 Aug 43, IT 120.

42. Tel Conv, 1550, 1 Aug 43, IT 120.

43. MS #P-058, Project 46, 1 Feb-8 Sep 43, Questions 8 and 11; Cf. Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, p. 96.

44. Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, pp. 227-32. Rintelen dispatched a telegram outlining Badoglio's views, a copy (Telg 3706 of 1 Aug 43) of which is in *Westl. Mittelmeer, Chefs*, (H 22/290), pp. 91-93. The text as printed by Rintelen does not exactly agree with this copy which is the copy received from the German Foreign Office.

45. Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, p. 233.

46. Tel Conv, 1810, 1 Aug 43, and Tel Conv, 2230, 1 Aug 43, both in IT 120; Rommel, Private KTB, entry 1 Aug 43.

47. Telg No. 636/Op, *XXXV Corps to Ministry of War, Rome*, 1 Aug 43, IT 102. Italian memoirs after the war all state that the descent of German reinforcements over the frontiers began on 26 July 1943 and without warning. See Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, p. 85; Roatta, *Otto milioni*, p. 272; Rossi, *Come arrivammo*, p. 88; Zanussi, *Guerra e catastrofe*, II, 47; Castellano, *Come firmai*, p. 73; and Guariglia, *Ricordi*, p. 576. The date 26 July appears first to have been fixed for subsequent writers in the article: Lt. Col. Mario Torsiello, "*L'aggressione germanica all'Italia nella sua fase preliminare (26 luglio-7 settembre 1943)*," *Rivista Militare*, I, vol. 4 (Rome, July, 1945). It is solemnly stated as a matter of court record in *Il Processo Carboni-Roatta*, p. 14. Actually, the only German troops entering Italy between 26 July and 1 August were parts of the *26th Panzer Division* (the bulk of which was already in Italy) and parts of the *2d Parachute Division* (which came by air).

48. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VIII.43*, 1 and 2 Aug 43; Rommel, Private KTB, entry 1 Aug 43.

49. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VIII.43*, 3 Aug 43; *Colloquio Generale Rossi-Generale Westphal*, 1230, 3 Aug 43, *Comando Supremo, Colloqui 1943*, IT 104.

50. *OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VIII.43*, 3 and 4 Aug 43.

51. See Guariglia, *Ricordi*, p. 619, n. 1.

52. Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, pp. 233-34. A briefer statement by Rintelen is to be found in MS #T-1a (Westphal *et al.*), Chapter II, page 23, where the interview with Hitler is dated the second rather than the third of August. *OKH/Attaché Abt., KTB 1.III.43-31.V. 44* (H27/56) contains the entry that Rintelen met with the Fuehrer on the Italian problem on 3 August 1943. Practically the same entry can be found in *OKH/Attaché Abt., Taetigkeitsberichte zum KTB*, Feb. 43-15 Jun 44 (H27/58).

53. Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, pp. 234-36.

54. On 24 August, Badoglio told Bonomi: "If the Germans would attack, the situation would have a solution. We cannot, by an act of our own will, separate ourselves from Germany to whom we are bound by a pact of alliance, but if attacked we shall resist and we will be able to turn for aid to our enemies of yesterday." (Bonomi, *Diario*, p. 82).

As late as 3 September the German Naval Attaché in Rome reported: "In higher circles the opinion prevails that ever since he assumed office, Badoglio has been trying to bring the war to as favorable a conclusion as possible, but only with Germany's consent, for Badoglio takes Italy's honor as an Axis partner very seriously." ONI, translation *German Naval Staff: Operations Division War Diary*, pt. A, vol. 49 (September 1943), p. 37.

55. Roatta gave a very clear and prophetic analysis in his memorandum, *S.M.R.E., Ufficio di Capo di Stato Maggiore, N. 26/CSM di Prot.*, 4 Aug 43, IT 104; Cf. Roatta, *Otto milioni*, p. 284.

56. Guariglia, *Ricordi*, pp. 553-54, 559-61.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 582-85, 609. See MS #P-058, Project 46, Question 9 and *Il Processo Carboni-Roatta*, pp. 18-19.

58. Badoglio, *Memorie e documenti*, p. 96; Guariglia, *Ricordi*, pp. 586-87; Ltr, Osborne to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, OCMH, 6 Jul 50; Ltr and Incls, Tittmann to Ward, OCMH, 19 Jul 50. The British minister received a new and safe cypher later that summer.

59. Guariglia, *Ricordi*, pp. 585-86, 619n; *Il Processo Carboni-Roatta*, p. 19.

60. Guariglia, *Ricordi*, p. 587. Castellano (*Come firmai*, page 72) records that he knew of the D'Ajeta mission but remains silent on whether he had any part in instigating the appointment. In any event, Castellano did not know the full scope of D'Ajeta's instructions.

[61.](#) Guariglia, *Ricordi*, pp. 587-88.

[62.](#) Guariglia, *Ricordi*, pp. 589-99; Telg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 5 Aug 43, OPD Exec 9, item II, No. 55.

[63.](#) Alberto Berio, *Missione segreta (Tangeri: Agosto 1943)* (Milan: Enrico Dall'Oglio, 1947), pp. 34-42.

[64.](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 54-70, D'Ajeta later presented his own account of the mission in his defense at epuration proceedings. See *Consiglio di Stato: Sezione speciale per l'epurazione, Memoria a svolgimento del ricorso del Consigliere di Legazione Blasco Lanza d'Ajeta contro la decisione della Commissione per l'epurazione del personale dipendente dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri* (Rome: Tipografia Ferraiolo, 1946), pp. 79-81, 84-87; and *Documenti prodotti a corredo della memorai del Consigliere di Legazione Blasco Lanza d'Ajeta* (Rome: Tipografia Ferraiolo, 1946), pp. 17-35.